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Introduction 
In his book Gr£'at Power Politics Qlld Norwegian Fon!igll Policy. A Study of 
Norway's Foreign Re/aLions November 1940 - February 19.f8. I\'ils Marten 
Udgaard has described the evolution of the Norwegian government's foreign 
policy during the second world war as developing from "total political commit-
ment to the Atlantic Great Powers early in the war; to a policy of non-
alignment and accommodation to Soviet interests at the close of the war".1 
According la Udgaard, this process revealed itself as "a continuous - though 
reluctant - re-orientation towards the Soviet Union, closely following the rise 
in Soviet power and influence".2 Udgaard sees it as a development closely 
connected with the evolution of relations between the great powers. He 
identifies two main determinants of Norwegian foreign policy during the war. 
On the one hand, there is the influence on Norwegian foreign policy of the 
evolving British and American policy towards the Soviet Union. On the other 
hand, the Norwegian government had to adjust its policy to the situation 
created by the steadily increasing role of the Soviet Union as the dominant 
single power facing Norway in the North. 
The question presents itself whether Udgaard's model is adequate and 
credible as a characterization of Norwegian foreign policy during the war 
years. And if this is the case, how did this policy reveal itself in the day-to-
day affairs of Norway's relations with the great powers? How did Norwegian 
policy-makers go about operationalizing their declaratory foreign policy? The 
question also rises about the character of the forces motivating the govern-
ment's foreign policy in the period under review. Did the politicians in charge 
of Norway's foreign relations at any stage intend to place Norway in a middle 
position between East and West? Or was Norway, as Udgaard's qualification 
cited above suggests, only reluctnntly forced into a position of apparent 
"accomodation to Soviet interests"? 
The underlying purpose of this study is to examine Norway's policy 
towards the Soviet Union during the war in light of the generalizations 
suggested by Udgaard. I will try to give a tentative answer to the questions 
asked above as far as the Norwegian policy towards the Soviet Union is 
concerned. The general aim, however, as the title suggests, is to give a 
comprehensive presentation of the Norwegian government's policy towards the 
Soviet Union from the German attack on Norway in April 1940 to the capitu-
lation of the German forces and the subsequent return of the government to 
Norway in the spring of 1945. Jt should be noted that I have deliberately 
chosen to offer more attention to topics which have been the object of only 
limited treatment by earlier researchers in the field, while for instance the 
now well-known story of president RooseveJt's free port scheme for Northern 
Norway, as well as the far more important Spilzbergen question in 1944/45, 
have only been given limited treatment. In addition, based on this more or less 
chronologically organized description of the Norwegian policy towards the 
Soviet Union, an attempt will be made to assess the influence of the Soviet 
Union on the Norwegian government's overall foreign policy during the war. 
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The main current in Norwegian foreign policy from about 1944 to Norway's 
emrance into NATO in 1949 is conventionally described as the policy of 
"bridge-building".3 Continuing the line of argument presente,d above, we will 
look for the operational content of this policy in the period of its formulation 
during the latter half of the war. Did the Norwegian government, as Udgaard 
suggests, really view Norway "as occupying an intermediate position between 
East and West,,?4 By pointing to the fact that the Norwegian government 
continued to involve Norway in a multitude of cooperative ventures with the 
western powers, particularly with regard to military matters, Udgaard himself 
warns against drawing too far-reaching conclusions about the meaning and the 
scope of the policy of ~bridge-building". Towards the end of the war Norway 
was, according to Udgaard, "in the process of being woven into the fabric of 
incipient western co-operation which was to develop fully in the post-war 
period".s In view of the fairly obvious fact that the Norwegian government's 
policy towards the Soviet Union ",'ill occupy a central position in all attempts 
to describe and evaluate the changes in ils main foreign policy line during the 
period under review, a discussion of the development of the relations between 
the government-in-exile and the Soviet Union during these crucial years should 
constitute a contribution to a better understanding of this general topic as 
well. 
Udgaard's main points have not, of course, been left unchallenged. The 
contributions of Olav Riste, who in books and articles has delivered strong 
arguments in favour of a re-evaluation of some of Nils Morten Udgaard's major 
points and conclusions. merit special attention.6 According to Riste, a descrip-
tion of twentieth century Norwegian foreign and security policy requires a 
two-level analysis. One the onc hand, there is the declared policy line. i.e. 
"[he public, official declarations and various kinds of acts which together 
constitute the nalion's official policy in mallers of security". On the other 
hand there is the no less important unofficial level: "the substructural realities, 
the often implicit preconditions",7 As a logical outcome of tbis line of thought 
Riste tends to place a greater stress on the continuity of the basic features 
of, or prereQui~itc~ for, Norwegian foreign policy. According to his alternative 
approach, "the Atlantic Ocean policy". which was introduced by the Norwegian 
minister of foreign affairs Tryg"e lieS in 1940 and further developed during 
1941, should be viewed in many respects as a mere formalization of the 
implicit precondition fo!' Norway's foreign policy since the independence in 
1905: namely the belief that the Atlantic great powers, then Great Britain, 
would stand ready to help Norway if it was faced with a threat from Germany 
or Russia. Riste continues his argument by stating that the shift during the 
war years from "Atlantic Ocean policy" towards a policy of "bridge-buildingH as 
the declared policy of the government did not signify that the Norwegians 
gave up their belief in the Atlantic powers as the ultimate guarantors of the 
integrity and security of Norway. The. redirection of the official line of policy 
towards a loosening of the formal ties to lhe western powers during the latter 
half of the period under review is not in dispute. It could be argued, however, 
(hat il is possible to direct the attention to other facets of Norway's relations 
with the great powers; facels which seem to necessitate a greate.r stress on 
the continuity in the policy of the Norwegian government. One could, for 
instance, point to the great variety of Norway's "functional ties" in military 
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and security matters with the United States and Great Britain. These ties were 
not cut after the introduction of the "bridge-building" doctrine as a main 
element of the official Norwegian foreign policy. 
Although my study deals with Norway's foreign policy during the war 
only, an examination of the government's policy towards the Soviet Union 
during the earliest phase of the "bridge-building" period might also give a 
contribution to the discussion of to which extent the decision in 1949 to 
participate in NATO represented a fundamental redirection of Norway's policy 
towards the great powers. If fears of Soviet expansionist plans in the North, 
the traditional Scandinavian "russophobia", were clearly influencing Norwegian 
foreign policy in the formative period of the "bridge-building" doctrine, rising 
tension between the Soviet Union and the western great powers would tend to 
revitalize the idea of Norwegian participation in a western defence system. 
The study is based on a variety of published and unpublished source material. 
It goes without saying that the riles of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs have been extensively utilized_ The Norwegian National Archives 
(Riksarkivet) are in possession of a mass of interesting material. Most impor-
tant for my purpose have been the archives of the post-war Parliamentary 
Commission of Investigation (Den parlamentariske undersokelseskommisjonen av 
1945), the minutes of cabinet meetings, various military files, and some of the 
private collections; not least the diaries and papers of professor Halvdan Koht, 
minister of foreign affairs until Trygve Lie took office in November 1940. The 
University Library in Oslo is the holder of various collections of letters and 
personal papers, the most important of which have been the diaries of Arne 
Ording, a principal advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs_ The material 
from Norwegian sources has been supplemented with documents from the Public 
Record Of rice in London (mainly from the Foreign Office), which have proven 
to be very useful by their illumination of certain elements of the Norwegian 
government's foreign policy_ 
Although the study is based to a high degree on unpublished sources, I 
have also made use of some collections of printed documents, monographs, 
articles, and memoirs. 
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Not Yet Allies 
Prior to the German attack on Norway on 9th April 1940 the various Norwe-
gian governments had paid only limited attention to their relations with the 
Soviet Union. Norwegian foreign policy was traditionally oriented towards the 
Nordic countries, Western Europe, and the USA, although the last years before 
the war had seen some limited attempts to explore the possibility of developing 
Norway's relations with the smaller countries in the eastern part of Europe. 
There is no doubt that Halvdan Koht, a historian of European reputation and 
minister of foreign affairs from 1935 to his resignation in November 1940, took 
a personal interest in developing the country's relations with the Soviet Union 
as well. These efforts. however. gave only limited results before the European 
war broke out in September 1939, and thereafter the attention of the Norwe-
gian government was mainly directed towards the limited aim of keeping 
Norway out of the war. Shortly afterwards, the Russian attack on Finland on 
30th November 1939 effectively blocked, for the time being, any attempt to 
establish closer Norwegian-Soviet political contacts. 
Norwegian-Soviet relaliollS hefore [lie Second World War 
The Norwegian attitude towards the Soviet Union before the war was characte-
rized by a widespread feeling of general uncertainty as to Soviet foreign policy 
goals, linked up with the traditional Scandinavian "russophobia", i.e. fear of 
inherent Russian expansionist tendencies westward through Scandinavia towards 
the Atlantic.9 This traditional line of thought was particularly wide-spread in 
the military establishment, although some important qualifications should be 
made. In the twenties and early thirties the possibility of a Soviet military 
threat to Norway seems in fact to have been largely disregarded, even in 
military circles. A report by a parliamentary Defence Commission in 1926 
concluded that Northern Norway for the time being was under no military 
threat from the Soviet Union.lO The Army High Command had concluded along 
similar lines in a situalional report in 1922.11 
Beginning in the late twenties, however, the increase of Soviet military 
and economic power gave rise to a growing concern about the Soviet Union's 
strategic objectives in the North. A report from the Navy Command in the 
autumn of 1929 suggests a revival of the traditional "russophobia". The exis-
tence of Soviet expansionist tendencies westward, which were expected to 
reveal themselves as soon as the domestic disturbances in the Soviet Union 
were brought to an end, was taken for granted: 
As soon as Russia renews its expansionist policy towards Finland, our own 
moment of destiny will - even if may be not in the first round - in 
actual fact arrive. I2 
Gradually the traditional fear of Russian military expansion was supplemented 
by a fear of "revolutionary expansionism". This direction of thought was most 
clearly expressed by the ialer nazi collaborator Yidkun Quisling during his 
period as defence minister in the early thirties. 13 
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Although there were signs of a growing concern for future developments 
in Northern Norway during the thirties, the actual scope of the strategically or 
ideologically motivated "russophobia" should not bee exaggerated. Voiced 
warnings about the possibility of an isolated Soviet expansionist drive against 
Norway's northern areas14· were the exception rather than the rule. Most 
serious attempts at analyzing the strategic significance of Norwegian territory 
to the Soviet Union seem to have limited themselves to a discussion of the 
situation in case of a general European war. 
In analyzing the significance of Norway's geostrategic position, the 
perspective of Northern Norway as a possible theatre of war in case of an 
armed clash between Germany and the Soviet Union was the focus of atten-
tion. German attempls at interrupting or bringing to a halt the shipments of 
supplies to the Soviet Union by way of the Arctic were then taken for 
granted. In order to achieve this aim, the Germans might wish to secure for 
themselves naval and air force bases along the Norwegian coast. Hi The 
Russians were assumed to be in exactly the opposite position. To achieve their 
primary aim of securing the vital lines of communication with the West, they 
were expected to see their interests best served by the existence of neutral 
waters along the Norwegian coast. The Navy Command did not to rule out the 
possibility of a Soviet preemptive move to secure bases on Norwegian territory 
for the purpose of denying the Germans the benefit of possessing similar bases. 
The necessary Soviet naval forces for such an operation were hardly at hand. 
The Russians were therefore most likely to apply a defensive strategy in the 
Arctic. 16 
Turning to Norwegian-Soyiet political relations, it is a well established 
and well-founded view that prior to August/September 1939 the broad outlines 
of the various Norwegian cabinets' policy towards the Soviet Union showed a 
spectacular degree of continuity. This was not least due to the general absence 
of serious political disagreement in matters of foreign policy between the 
major political parties.17 Shortly after the revolutions and the establishment of 
the new order in Russia, the Norwegians had set out to renew their economic 
and political relations with what was to be the Soviet Union. After the 
exchange of diplomatic representatives in 1924. the two countries mutual 
relations were characterized by the limited scope and significance of conflicts 
as well as the relative insignificane of relations in the economic, political and 
cultural fields. The Trotsky-affair, disagreements on fishery-rights in Arctic 
waters and some other sources of conflict were not able to spoil the basically 
good and tranquil relations between the two countries. 
Soviet policy in Europe after August 1939 brought profound changes in 
Norwegian attitudes towards the Soviet Union. For conservatives, the seemingly 
aggressive Soviet moves were less of a surprise: they had always warned 
against the inherent aggressiveness of the Communist system. Socialists and 
radicals found themselves in a more difficult position. The feeling of sympathy 
towards the internal achievements of the Soviet Union was still widespread. 
Now the sudden realization of the hard-to-conceal similarity between the 
expansionist tactics of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in matters of 
foreign policy brought to bear the need for a fundamental reevaluation of the 
basic attitudes towards the Soviet system as a whole. for the socialisl fureign 
minister Halvdan Koht, however, the need for a reevaluation was less acute: to 
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him relations among all the great powers were a matter of mere power 
politics, independent of the socio-political system in each country.18 
The Soviet attack on Finland on 30th November 1939 brought by a single 
stroke the Soviet Union to the centre of Norwegian foreign policy. The 
Norwegian policy line was clear from the outset: to keep Norway clear of the 
conflict. On this point there was hardly any disagreement. However, some 
politicians, amongst whom the future foreign minister Trygve Lie was promi-
nent, were in favour of a more active material help to Finland without 
breaching the formal rules of neutrality.19 
Soon rumours began to circulate about the imminence of co-ordinated 
Soviet-German moves against Northern Norway, in striking contrast to the 
earlier basic doctrine that a threat to Norway would emanate from a conflict 
between the two major antagonists on the European continent. The military 
preparedness of Norwegian forces in the areas bordering to Finland in the 
North was consequently heightened. 
There is little evidence that responsible Norwegian authorities actually 
feared a complete Soviet conquest of Finland with a subsequent attack on 
Norway. On the other hand, the Soviet behaviour could not help but deepen 
the general uncertainty and anxiety as to Soviet foreign policy objectives in a 
wider perspective. Frequent rumours about Soviet preparations to move against 
Norway left their traces in Norwegian opinion, and were to reappear on 
several occasions during the following years. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
relations with the Soviet Union, and the question of the Russian intentions 
towards Norway, came to occupy a prominent place in the political delibera-
tions of foreign minister Halvdan Koht and the rest of the Norwegian govern-
ment during the campaign in Norway in the spring of ) 940. 
Will the Soviet Union intervene? The campaign in Norway 1940 
The official Soviet reaction to the German attack on Norway and Denmark on 
9th April 1940 went rather far in expressing understanding and sympathy with 
the German cause. Molotov ended a conversation with the German ambassador 
von Schulenburg that morning by wishing Germany complete success in its 
"defensive measures".20 The Soviet attitude as perceived by the Norwegian 
diplomats in Moscow was more ambiguous. In fact the Norwegians did not hear 
anything from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and only on 16th April did 
a meeting take place on Norwegian initiative between the Norwegian minister21 
in Moscow, Einar Maseng, and the director of the Scandinavian department in 
the Commissariat, Pavel D. Orlov. The Norwegian legation was left without any 
instructions from Kohl after the German attack, and in this situation Maseng 
found it difficult to ask for a meeting with Molotov himself. 22 The conver-
sation with Orlov on the 16th, and impressions gathered during a second talk a 
few days later, seem to have convinced the Norwegian minister that the Soviet 
Union for the time being was bent on assuming the role of an observer in the 
conflict. In Maseng's opinion, furthermore, the public Soviet endorsement of 
the German cause was a cover for a more fundamental feeling of sympathy foI' 
the Norwegian struggle. In his messages minister Maseng consequently laid 
10 
great stress on what he regarded as a primary Soviet interest in keeping the 
parts of Norway close to the Soviet Union out of the reach of the other great 
powers. Maseng expressed the hope that Eastern Finnmark would not be 
touched by the ongoing conflict. 2S 
Halvdan Kohl, on the other hand, during the campaign repeatedly 
expressed grave anxiety in his diary as to the possibility of a Soviet move 
against Norway in (he North.:H There seems to have been, however, some 
inherent inconsistencies in Kohl's reflections about what could trigger such a 
Russian mOve. During the first part of the campaign the foreign minister 
feared a development similar to that in Poland, i.e. that the Russians, by 
taking advantage of the confused situation in Norway, should occupy parts of 
the country. "That will mean partition of our country, and the fate of free 
Norway will be sealed".25 This line of argument led him in the early days of 
May to ask for a more determined and effective allied military effort in the 
Narvik area.26 During the following weeks Koht gradually became convinced 
that the primary interest of the Soviet government was to keep Northern 
Norway free of troops from allY of the other great powers, allied or German. 
Consequently, the Soviets were expected to view favorably the perspective of 
Northern Norway as an neutral enclave under exclusively Norwegian control. A 
letter from minister Maseng, which reached Koht during his visit in London on 
7th May, may in this respect have been of some importance. Maseng reiterated 
the content of his previous messages, stressing that the Soviet Union in fact 
wanted Norway to continue as an independent state, not under military control 
by any of the belligerent nations.27 Koht at this time, however, was still of 
the opinion that the Russians preferred Northern Norway to be under German, 
rather than allied, control. The only alternative left was that this part of the 
country remained under Norwegian control. This would presuppose strong allied 
support in logistics and possibly with troops as well, a development which was 
expected to be extremely unwelcome to the Russians.28 
Towards the end of May. Koht seems to have concluded that the Soviet 
Union was possibly no less apprehensive of an eventual permanent German than 
of an allied armed presence in the North of Norway and in Scandinavia in 
general. The Soviet minister in Stockholm, Alexandra Kollontay, sought to 
convince Koht that the Soviet Union took an interest in the continued 
independence of NorwaY,29 and her assurances that the Soviets were bent on 
the withdrawal of the German troops from Norway after the end of hostilities 
were confirmed by Norwegian diplomatic sources.so Strong Soviet verbal 
support at this time in favour of Swedish neutrality served to strengthen 
Kohl'S conviction that the Russians were not at all happy with the German 
presence in Scandinavia.31 As a consequence of this line of thought the 
foreign minister in the last days of May set in motion a diplomatic action with 
the aim of making the Soviet government more sympathetic towards the allied 
cause in Norway; a plan which, oot surprisingly, led to oothing.32 
The two leading Norwegian military men during the campaign, generals 
Otto Ruge and Carl August Fleischer, were no less than the minister of 
foreign affairs apprehensive as to possible Soviet intentions. Early in May 
general Ruge in a memorandum pointed to the importance of a strong allied 
military effort in Northern Norway, arguing that a weak Norwegian or allied 
military presence could lead to some sort of Soviet military interference 10 
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Norway's northernmost county.ss General Fleischer argued along similar lines 
in a situational report after the allied reconquest of Narvik at the end of May. 
Being unaware of the allied decision to evacuate Norway, Fleischer was 
optimistic about the possibilities of stabilizing the front in Northern Norway. 
thereby keeping parts of the country under Norwegian or allied control. The 
general, however, pointed to the danger of a Soviet attack in the north-
easternmost part of the country. Although the actual fighting was limited to 
the counties of Troms and Nordland, general Fleischer had consequently kept 
some contingents of troops in Eastern Finnmark as a minimum security 
measure. A Soviet move against Norway, in Fleischer's view, would mean an 
imminent danger of "the whole of Scandinavia being swallowed by Russia and 
Germany".3'( Fleischer therefore also argued in favour of the stationing of 
allied troops in the North-East to ward off an eventual Soviet attack. The 
Norwegian forces in the area were too weak to halt and repulse a massive 
Soviet advance.35 
The widespread fear and uncertainty as to Soviet intentions also played a 
part in the formulation of some Norwegian politico-military initiatives towards 
the end of the campaign. Firstly, an earlier idea of reaching an agreement 
with the Germans about a demarcation line in the Narvik area between Norwe-
gian and German troops, possibly with Swedish troops occupying a corridor to 
the North and South of the line, was revived when the allies communicated to 
the Norwegian government their decision to evacuate Norway. Having rejected 
the idea on several earlier occasions, the cabinet resumed discussions of the 
proposal during their meeting on 1st June. It appears that the future minister 
of foreign affairs, Trygve Lie, presented arguments against the project 
reminiscent of the views expressed by generals Ruge and Fleischer. Trygve Lie 
feared that an area in the North which was held by only comparably weak 
Norwegian forces was liable to present an attractive aim for Soviet expansio-
nist drives. Foreign minister Koht, on the other hand, arguing in favour of the 
view that the Russians' primary interests were best served by the absence of 
troops in Northern Norway from either of the belligerent great powers, 
thought the project worth trying.s6 Kohl consequenlly undertook a last-minute 
effort to come to an agreement with the Germans about a line of demarcation, 
supervised by Swedish troops, in the conviction that "the Russians would be 
happy about the prospect of an absence of foreign great powers troops from 
Northern Norway". 
A subsequent arrangement with the Germans, about the stationing of some 
Norwegian border troops under Norwegian command in Eastern Finnmark after 
the Norwegian capitulation, is a best understood as a development of the 
Norwegian military commanders' fear of the Soviet Union's intentions. The 
arrangement, in fact, came about on general Ruge's initiative. 
Ruge's motives were clearly expressed during a conversation with the 
British general Pollock on 4th June. Ruge feared the consequences of Northern 
Norway being left as a no-man's-land between Soviet and German troops. 
Referring to the idea of a Swedish-supervised demarcation line Ruge told the 
British general that 
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he feared a move by Russia against Northern Norway on lines of those in 
Poland unless either (a) Swedish proposals now entertained for demarcated 
neutral zone permitted Norway to maintain Government and armed forces 
in North or (b) control by German forces including Finnmark.37 
According to general Ruge, the prospect of a German occupation of the whole 
of Norway was preferable to the Soviets establishing themselves in the north-
easternmost part of the country. Consequently the Norwegian representatives, 
in the negotiations with the Germans about the capitulation agreement for the 
Norwegian forces in Northern Norway, proposed a continued Norwegian armed 
presence in the county of Finnmark until the Germans themselves were ready 
to replace the Norwegian forces there.ss The capitulation agreements from 
10th June in fact stipulated the continued service of some small Norwegian 
armed contingents in Eastern Finnmark. Only in July did German troops arrive 
to take over the duties of, and disarm, the last Norwegian units in Finnmark. 
The Soviet Unioll ill Norwegiall foreigll policy during the summer 1940 
We have already noted the discrepancy between the official Soviet reactions to 
the German attack on Norway and the numerous hints and unofficial declara-
tions of a more sympathetic attitude to the Norwegian cause. The messages 
from the Norwegian minister in Moscow during the campaign in the spring of 
1940 served to weaken the fear and anxiety in Norwegian government and 
military circles as to Soviet intentions in Norway. The Soviet minister in 
Stockholm, Alexandra Kollontay, played a special part in conveying to leading 
Norwegians expressions of Soviet good-will and interest in the continuance of 
Norway as an independent country.S9 The Soviets also gave the Swedes 
assurances of similar content.40 
When the government had established itself in London in June 1940, it 
gradually became clear that the former position of Halvdan Koht as the 
unapproachable and decisive member of the cabinet in matters of foreign policy 
was in the process of withering away. Koht was identified with the traditional 
Scandinavian policy or neutrality, and the increasing opposition against his 
conduct of the government's foreign policy ultimately led to the instalment in 
office of Trygve Lie as new minister of foreign affairs in late November 1940. 
This change was by Norwegians and the allies correctly perceived as the 
consequence of a growing concern about the need to develop Norway's 
relations with her main ally, Great Britain, thereby symbolizing the abandon-
ment of the policy of Norwegian neutrality. 
During the summer of 1940, Halvdan Koht and his adversaries were 
involved in a complex discussion of objectives and instrumentalities in Norwe-
gian foreign policy. Koht himself, although castigated as a "neutraIjst", should 
not be presented as being in favour of simply continuing the pre-war neutra-
lity-oriented foreign policy; an alternative which in the new circumstances of 
war and emigration was clearly seen as non-existent. However, there was still 
considerable leeway f9r argument as to the character and scope of co-opera-
tion with Great Britain as the main allied belligerent power. Consequently, the 
discussion evolved around the general question or Norway's place in the 
alliance, with the relations with Great Britain as its focal point. Relations with 
the Soviet Union constituted, however, an important element of the debate, 
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and in order to understand the reasons for this we will make an atlempt to 
reconstruct the basic traits of KohlS evaluation of the situation during the 
first summer in London. 
After the allied defeat in Norway and France and after Italy's entrance 
into the war, Koht was rather pessimistic about the probable outcome of the 
struggle. This is clearly revealed in the foreign minister's diary. In late June, 
for instance, Koht expected the rest of his life to be spent in emigration.4l 
This pessimistic outlook had some direct consequences for Kohts's foreign 
policy doctrine during his last months in office. In the case of Great Britain 
being defeated by Germany, the argument went, a complete Norwegian identifi-
cation with the British cause would make the prospects of continued, albeit 
limited, Norwegian independence bleak indeed. Consequently, according to this 
point of view, Norwegian interests were best served by a foreign policy 
stressing the independent stance of the government-in-exile, although Kohl 
himself never argued in favour of a complete Norwegian disentanglement from 
the allied cause. 
Relations with the Soviet Union were accorded an important role in 
Koht's foreign policy scheme. The uncertainly as to Great Britain's position 
when the war was over could in itself be presented as an argument in favour 
of Koht's "independence line". Arguing over the possible role of the Soviet 
Union in the case of an allied defeat, Koht came to similar conclusions. The 
Soviet Union, as one of the two remaining continental great powers after an 
allied defeat or some sort of compromise peace, would no doubt be in a 
position to exert decisive influence when the shape and order of post-war 
Europe was decided. It would then obviously be in Norway's interest to be able 
to draw on a reserve of Soviet good-will and, jf possible, on a commitment to 
the restoration of some sort of Norwegian state. 42 Fundamental to Koht's view 
was an assumption that the Soviets would be favorably inclined towards a 
Norwegian foreign policy which stressed the nation'S continued independence in 
matters of foreign affairs within the framework of the war-time alliance with 
Great Britain. In this connection it is noteworthy that Koht, some weeks after 
his arrival in London, made use of an opportunity to assure Ivan Maisky, the 
Soviet ambassador to His British Majesty's government, that the Norwegians 
had not asked for allied help after the German attack. Ivan Maisky, according 
to Kohl, attached due importance to his communication.43 
The attitude of the foreign minister may be characterized by a remark he 
reportedly made during another interview with the Soviet ambassador. Accor-
ding to Maisky, Koht spoke of Norway as "still remaining 'neutral' though at 
war with Germany".44 Some of the members of the Norwegian cabinet were of 
the opinion that Koht wanted Norway to be "a belligerent neutral". The 
minister of justice, Terje Wold, returned on various occasions to a discussion 
of Koht's views on foreign policy in his diary. According to Wold, Kohl held 
the view that "our position in relation to Russia wjJJ be better [, .. 1 the less we 
have to do with England".4S 
The opposition to Kohl's policy line was most fully formulated in a 
memorandum from 10th Jyly 1940, written by Arne Ording and signed by him 
and four other intellectuals of the inner circle surrounding the government.46 
Many of their main presumptions about the foundations of Norwegian foreign 
policy accorded with Kohl's own basic views. The Soviet expansionist policy 
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since September 1939 was explained as measures aiming at the strengthening of 
the Soviet Union's defensive positions against Germany. "The five", just as 
Halvdan Koht himself, were of the opinion that the Germans had given 
assurances to the Soviet government as to their long-term intentions in 
Scandinavia. The Soviet Union would make every effort to gain benefits from 
an eventual break-down of the British empire, at the same time as the German 
expansion in territory, power, and influence would give rise to growing 
concern in Moscow. According to "the five", the Soviet Union might ultimately 
feel compelled to join in the war against Germany. There were, however, other 
alternatives. In order to secure its own interest without going to war against 
Germany, the Soviet Union could claim a part in a German-led reshaping of 
Europe. In that case the position of Norway would be decided by agreement 
between the two continental great powers. This far there was in fact no 
fundamental disagreement between "the five" and Koht's own views. On the 
other hand, the consequences for Norwegian foreign policy of this line of 
analysis did give rise to disagreement. 
The memorandum was quite clear in its rejection of a policy stressing 
Norway's independence and autonomy in her relations with Great Britain in 
order to preserve and cultivate the Soviet connection. In this respect "the 
five" utilized a two-level analysis. First, they argued that all attempts at a 
really effective war-time cooperation between Norway and her allies would be 
seriously hampered by a Norwegian policy of preparing for the worst alterna-
tive by building up her relations with a great power which was supporting the 
allies' adversary in the war. Norway must avoid the situation of being suspec-
ted of cultivating friendship with "the foe of her ally". This argument went to 
the core of Koht's foreign policy doctrine, and it appears reasonable to 
suppose that "the five" were hinting directly at the foreign minister's conver-
sation with Ivan Maisky a few days earlier. Secondly, "the five" argued that 
the Soviet Union, as a consequence of its interest in avoiding Norway's 
complete dominance by Great Britain, must view favorably all attempts to make 
Norway an active participant in the war. A policy of active cooperation with 
the allied powers in the struggle for the allied cause was Norway's single 
chance of asserting the country's position as a sovereign power, thereby 
avoiding "complete dependence on England in case of a German defeat". 
Summing up: "the five's" principal concern was the necessity of developing a 
more active and whole-hearted cooperation with the British. The relationship 
with the Soviet Union, which was of only limited interest jf treated in isola-
tion, thus gained in importance by its potential influence on Norwegian-British 
relations. 
The argument about the government's foreign policy continued during the 
rest of the summer and during the autumn 1940. Koht answered his opponents 
in the beginning of September, in a lengthy memorandum provoked by a letter 
from the members of cabinet Anders Fjelslad and Sven Nielsen. Olav Riste has 
traced two main elements in Kohl'S argument. One the one hand, there is his 
preference for arguments in terms of "Real-politik", stressing the limited 
validity of formal agreements when they are confronted with the harsh reality 
of conflicting great power interests. One the other hand, there is the foreign 
minister's great stress on the relations with the Soviet Union. The crucial 
point in this respect is Koht's disbelief in ultimate allied victory. The prospect 
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of a compromise peace, or even an allied defeat, enhanced the potential 
importance of cultivating the relations with the Soviet Union as one of the 
two dominant continental powers. What would be the attitude of the Soviet 
government towards Norway if Great Britain lost the war? Could Germany and 
the Soviet Union be expected to reach an agreement on the partition of 
Norway, or would the Soviet Union act as a guaranLOr of continued Norwegian 
statehood and independence? 
At the foundation of Koht's foreign policy doctrine was the second, opti-
mistic, alternative. The Soviet Union, according to Koht, was primarily inte-
rested in denying any of the other great powers "strategic positions in 
Norway". In fact. Koht had reason to believe that the Soviets had been assured 
of Germany's intention to evacuate Norway after the war. Neither the Soviet 
Union nor Germany would allow the other part the benefit of establishing 
themselves in a dominant position in Norway. This situation, according to Koht, 
lent itself open to exploitation by the politicians in charge of Norwegian 
foreign policy, if Norway only avoided being hopelessly identified with the 
allied cause. 
The installment in office as minister of foreign affairs in November 1940 
of Trygve Lie, former minister of supplies, meant a radical departure from the 
"Kohl doctrine" in Norwegian foreign policy. The new foreign policy doctrine. 
which was to be known as "the Atlantic Ocean policy~, or simply the "Atlantic 
policy". represented a fundamental departure from the traditional Norwegian 
policy of neutrality. Some isolated voices, for instance the Norwegian minister 
in Moscow, Einar Maseng, continued to argue in favour of a more "indepen_ 
dent" foreign policy line. At this stage it suffices to note, however, that the 
representatives of the old line of neutrality had lost their influence. The 
change in the Norwegian foreign policy was profound, indeed. 
The Soviet Unioll ill Norwegiall loreigll policy. November 1940 - 221ld JUlle 
1941 
Norwegian pre-war foreign policy had primarily aimed to keep Norway and 
Scandinavia outside the conflicts between the great powers. However, the fate 
of the small countries of Europe since the outbreak of the world war served 
to question the continued validity of this basic doctrine. The alternative was 
to seek post-war security through cooperation with the group of non-aggres-
sive~ "friendly" great powers. To the Norwegians, given the primary direction 
of Norway's international commercial, political, and cultural affinities, every 
alliance-system of which Norway was to be a member must be based on the 
participation of Great Britain. However, right from the beginning the Norwe-
gians also stressed the importance of American participation in the planned 
cooperation.'(7 
The general idea of a continuation of the cooperation between the allies 
after the war might seem a logical outcome of the new solidarity and realiza-
tion of common interest among the great and small comrades-in-arms. Of 
greater interest is the operational content Lie gave his ideas even at an early 
stage of their elaboration. Lie wanted to offer Great Britain and the USA 
military bases in Norway even in times of peace. This idea was aired for the 
first time in the autumn of 1940, and shows that, as far as the foundations of 
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Norway's security were concerned, the new foreign minIster and his advisors 
had a frame of reference that differed radically from the dominant pre-war 
doctrine. 48 
What was the role of the Soviet Union in the new foreign policy 
doctrine? On the one hand, there is the question of the purpose of the system, 
i.e. whether the planned arrangement of military and political cooperation 
between the Atlantic powers was to have the dual purpose of creating security 
against both German and Soviet aggression. On the other hand: if the Soviet 
Union was not perceived as a potential future threat. did the creators of the 
Atlantic policy view the future system in the light of possible Soviet active 
participation and responsibility? 
The introduction of (he Atlantic policy in the autumn of 1940 must be 
viewed not least as influenced by Lie's perception of the need to stress 
Norway's will to identify its cause with that of the allies, in order to ensure 
that the great allies would be committed to the complete restoration of 
Norway as a free and independent country in any peace settlement. In other 
words, the Atlantic policy was partly a demonstrative policy of fairly short-
range goals.49 The limitation of potential participants in the system to the 
countries along the shores of the North Atlantic was, according to Lie, 
preconditioned by these powers' cooperation in the war against Germany.50 In 
this perspective, the offer of bases in Norway 10 Great Britain and the USA 
presents itself as an additional attempt to convince the great allies of 
Norway's uncompromising will to cooperation and responsibility in the war-time 
alliance. 
The Atlantic policy did, however, have a long-range operational content 
as well. The first to introduce Lie to the idea of Atlantic military-political 
cooperation seems to have been Dr Arnold Ra:stad, a specialist in international 
law and an advisor to the government in matters of foreign policy.51 Ra:stad's 
concern was the necessity of creating a set of "security combines" which 
together would be strong enough to eliminate the possibility of renewed 
aggression on the part of Germany or Japan. 52 R.estad left no hints as to the 
eventual necessity of safeguarding against Soviet expansion as well. The area 
of n:~ponsibiIity of each of the "combines", together with its system of 
military bases, was to constHute na strategically complete field of defensive 
operations".53 In Or Ra!stad's opinion, the countries bordering on the North 
Atlantic together constituted such a regional entity, and he consequently 
argued in favour of the creation of a "North Atlantic Security Combine".54 
Neither a purely European nor a Nordic system would be strong enough to give 
Norway the sufficient degree of security against aggression from an expansio-
nist great power. Within the framework of each of the regional organizations 
there should be created "a permanent military machinery, sufficiently manned 
and alertly watched", which was to dispose of "massed air and sea forces".55 
From the perspective of the familiar post-war bipolar world order it may 
seem strange that the Norwegian government prior to 22nd June 1941 appa-
rently did little to explore the possible future role of the Soviet Union when 
formUlating its own long-range foreign policy programme. But in fact. when 
reviewing the scarce source material on the subject, every description of the 
Norwegian government's views in this respect must to a certain degree be 
speculative and tentative. After the war Trygve Lie was to say that the Soviet 
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Union, from the very beginning of the evolution of the idea, was assigned a 
role within the propagated North Atlantic security system. Any mentioning of 
that country in connection with the Atlantic policy in the autumn of 1940 
would, however, have led to "complications".56 The importance of this and 
some other similar post-war statements about the content of the Atlantic 
policy may easily be exaggerated. More fundamental to the understanding of 
Norwegian policy towards the Soviet Union prior to (and to some extent, even 
after) the German attack on the Soviet Union on 22nd June 1941 is the high 
degree of uncertainty about Soviet intentions in the international field, and 
the lack of reliable information among Norwegian politicians with regard to 
most aspects of Soviet foreign policy. As a result, the place of the Soviet 
Union in Norwegian foreign policy planning was largely left open. 
There is, however, some evidence in favour of the view that the Norwe-
gians neither before nor after June 1941 were inclined or wished to assign to 
the Soviet Union a role in the planned defence system in the North Atlantic. 
Admittedly, Lie in a letter to the leading labour politician Martin Tranma:l in 
May 1941 wrote that "still more would be gained" with the participation of the 
Soviet Union in the system if this was possible "without weakening our own 
security".51 But this possibility was clearly seen as hypothetical. Other 
evidence reveals Lie's distrust of the Soviet Union. For instance. when during 
June and July 1941 the Norwegians and the Soviets were in the process of 
revitalizing their diplomatic relations, Lie remarked to Anthony Eden that he 
"was not without a suspicion that Russia had ultedor designs on Spitzbergen 
and hoped thereby to secure an outlet for herself to the Allantic".58 tn the 
autumn 1942, moreover, Lie expressed apprehension nbout signs of Soviet 
intentions of demanding a role in any North Atlantic defence system. "If only", 
Lie told Laurence Collier, Bdtish ambassador to the Norwegian government, 
"your authorities had not taken such a long time to consider my original 
proposals, we might have avoided this danger". 59 
Supposing that the Soviet Union did not play the part of a participant in 
Lie's scheme for the Atlantic security system: did Lie and his advisors prior to 
June 1941 in fact assign to the propagated Atlantic policy the primary task of 
safeguarding against possible Soviet aggression in the future? On the one hand, 
there is the almost complete lack of direct evidence to support such a view. 
On the other hand, there is, as noted above, no lack of evidence of a general 
suspicion as to Soviet intentions in the realm of foreign policy. In regard to 
northern Europe this suspicion was often visualized as a Soviet drive towards 
direct access to the Atlantic through Scandinavia. These tendencies, resembling 
the traditional Scandinavian "russophobia", were to reassert themselves with 
force right up to the very end of the war. On some occasions after June 1941, 
Lie would even give subtle hints at Norwegian participation in the system of 
Atlantic cooperation as a measure of security against possible Soviet pressure. 
However, the operational content of the North Atlantic defence system as 
elaborated by Lie through J940 and 1941 was basic1y seen as a way of preclu-
ding new aggression in the future on the part of Germany. In the midst of the 
life and death struggle with that country, a possible future Soviet threat I'.'as a 
matter of less urgency. 
It should be noted that the Atlantic policy did not exist as a ful1y 
developed foreign policy doctrine during the latter half of 1940 and the first 
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half of 1941. In the letter to Martin Tranma!1 cited above, Lie laid stress on 
explaining that the Atlantic doctrine at that stage (Le. May 1941) was only 
"scaHered thoughts" about his main concern: "the future freedom and security 
of Norway".GO Even more important was the ambiguous position of the Soviet 
Union in the war. Nobody, at least not the politicians in charge of Norwegian 
foreign policy, had any clear-cut ideas as to the future role of the Soviet 
Union in Europe and the world. It was therefore clearly outside the range of 
possibility to elaborate a long-range policy towards the Soviet Union. In the 
long, as well as in the short run, the dominant determinant of Norwegian 
foreign policy doctrines was the relations to Great Britain and the USA. The 
Soviet connection was only a secondary one. 
The last months before the German invasion of the Soviet Union marked 
the low ebb of Norwegian-Soviet relations. On 8th May 1941, the Soviet 
government broke off diplomatic relations with the Norwegian government, 
using as a pretext that Norway no longer existed as a sovereign nation.61 
There was no forewarning of the Soviet decision, and the Norwegian govern-
ment was taken by complete surprise. In fact. just as during the spring of 
1940, the Soviet attitude towards the Norwegians remained rather ambiguous. 
lvan Maisky, for instance, continued to address formal letters to "the Royal 
Norwegian Government in London",62 and Soviet diplomats in Helsinki and 
Stockholm were at pains to explain to their Norwegian colleagues that the 
Soviet move was in fact not directed against Norway at all. After some initial 
confusion and anxiety as to the next possible Soviet move, Lie and the 
government came to the conclusion that the Soviet withdrawal of recognition 
from the Norwegian and Belgian representations in Moscow was to be under-
stood as an attempt to placate the Germans after the rather unhappy Russian 
involvement in Yugoslavian affairs just before that country was overrun by the 
German armies. The Norwegians chose to leave the matter without any formal 
protests, thereby hoping to minimize the practical significance of the Soviet 
decision. 
The Soviet decision of 8th May nevertheless made the task of forming a 
Norwegian policy towards the Soviet Union still more difficult. The main 
Question of the place of the Soviet Union in the war remained fundamentally 
unanswered until the German attack on 22nd June. The minister of foreign 
affairs had himself discussed the matter with a number of high-ranking and 
well-informed British and other officials during May and June, but continued to 
feel uncertain about the development of Soviet-German relations and Soviet 
intentions almost until the Germans finally attacked.63 The Soviet move on 8th 
May, in any case, served to deepen the Norwegi3n suspicions of Soviet 
intentions and motives in the field of foreign affairs.G• 
The German attack brought an end to speculations, and was to introduce 
into Soviet-Norwegian relations an era of attempts at cooperation in solving 
tasks of common interest to the two countries. The Norwegian military 
establishment had since long been aware of the potential importance of 
Northern Norway in case of a Soviet-German conflict. The Germans were 
expected to attempt to disturb the shipping of supplies to the Soviet Union 
from bases along the Norwegian coast. The allies would have to consider 
counter-measures. The Army High Command concluded in a situational report in 
May 1941 that "in case of the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia, 
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military operations in Northern Norway may be expected, and a British 
operation is very likely to take place".65 
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Cooperation and Alliance. June 1941 - May 1944 
Only informal contacts remained in Norwegian-Soviet relations during the last 
months leading up to the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet 
Union. In this respect the Soviet move on 8th May 1941 had merely been an 
affirmation of sla/us quo. The new situation now presented the Norwegian 
government with a set of fundamentally different tasks to be solved with 
regard to the Soviet Union. First, normal diplomatic relations had to be 
restored. Then the two countries could seek to develop their mutual military, 
political, and commercial relations. 
The Norwegian response 10 the German attack 011 the Soviet Union 
Whereas the official Dritish reaction to the German attack was a declaration of 
unreserved support for the Soviet cause,66 the Norwegian government only 
hesitatingly took a public stance. Laurence Collier, British minister to the 
Norwegian government, felt the absence of any official Norwegian reaction 
during the first few days as rather embarrassing, and consequently asked the 
Norwegians to give public support to the British declaration. The Foreign 
Office, he said, was anxious to avoid the impression of dissent among the 
allies in this matter. 61 
The anticipated declaration from the Norwegian government finally 
appeared as part of a general expose by Lie of the government's foreign policy 
on 28th June. Although Lie's declaration gave unreserved support to the views 
of Churchill, Eden and Attlee, the wording of the declaration did reveal a 
certain reluctance to become too closely identified with the Soviet Union.68 
There were several reasons for the ambiguous Norwegian attitude to the 
entrance of the Soviet Union into the war on the allied side. On the one 
hand, there was widespread doubt about the effectiveness and will of resis-
tance of the Soviet army. The coverage of the invasion in the official Norsk 
Tidelld in the form of a small notice on page three may in this respect be 
regarded as symptomatic. No less important was the known skeptical altitude 
towards the Soviet Union in Norwegian public opinion as well as among the 
London politicians themselves. The Fenno-Soviet war of 1939/40 had left a 
profound impact. and the government may have feared that too close an 
identification with the Soviet Union might present the German propagandists in 
Norway with a fertile field for exploitation. As will be shown later, this 
argument was made Quite explicit when the Russians soon were to present the 
idea of a formal Soviet-Norwegian treaty of alliance. 
A letter from Johan Ludvig Mowinckel to premier Johan Nygaardsvold may 
be Quoted as an example of the widespread feeling of ambiguity in the face of 
eventual Soviet participation in the war together with the western allies. 
Writing a few days before the actual German attack, Mowinckel held the view 
that the allies ought not to give the Soviet Union immediate moral or material 
support in the case of war between Germany and the Soviet Union: 
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The Soviet Union should never be allowed to become an ally in the 
democracies' struggle for freedom [ ... ] Of course, the prospect of the two 
villains mutually weakening each other is in our interest indeed, but we 
ought not to forget that we are fighting in the name of democracy and 
freedom, and the new world can not be built on the foundations of the 
unscrupulous and lawless policy of the "friends" of 1939. Good democrats 
in all countries will feel worried if we tie our future too closely to the 
Soviet Union. 69 
The variations of opinion within the cabinet is not easily open to recon-
struction. Trygve Lie, who had lost his illusions about the "idealism" of Soviet 
foreign policy as a result of the Soviet participation in the 1939 partition of 
Poland, had himself been on the side of the "activists" during the Fenno-Soviet 
war. 70 After 22nd June, however, no real alternative was left open to the 
Norwegians but to follow the British in their support of the Soviet war effort. 
Dip/omatic reialioflS resumed 
The Question of resuming normal diplomatic relations between Norway and the 
Soviet Union was prompted in July 1941 by the discussion of a joint Norwe-
gian-Soviet-British military expedition to the Spitzbergen archipelago, which 
had been under Norwegian jurisdiction since 1925. 
The Norwegians felt that it was up to the Soviet government to take the 
first step towards normalization of relations. The question was brought into 
the open when Laurence Collier during a conversation with Lie on 17th July 
informed the Norwegian foreign minister that Molotov had proposed the 
planning of a So,,'iet-British military expedition to the archipelago.71 As a 
precondition for any talks about allied military intervention in the Spitzbergen 
archipelago Lie at once demanded the complete restoration of diplomatic 
relations between the Norwegian government and the Soviet Union.72 
The following day Lie discussed the matter with Anthony Eden, and the 
two ministers agreed that any discussions about Spitzbergen had to be pre-
conditioned by the full recognition by the Soviet Union of Norwegian sove-
reignty over the islands, and Soviet recognition of the Norwegian government 
in London followed by the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two 
governments. Ivan Maisky gave his agreement the same day.73 
On 21st July, Ivan Maisky presented Erik Cotban, the Norwegian minister 
to the British government, with the text of a proposed Soviet-Norwegian treaty 
built on the agreement which had been signed between the Soviet and Czecho-
slovak governments some days earlier. In addition to restoring normal diplo-
matic relations, the proposed treaty pledged the two governments to give each 
other every kind of help and support in the war against hitJerite Germany.H 
Erik Colban was in favour of accepting the Soviet proposal, which would 
have formalized Norway's hitherto de facto alliance with the Soviet Union. The 
treaty, however, had to be presented to the Norwegians in a way which made 
it perfectly clear that the protocol did not include any additional secret 
agreements. 75 Trygve Lie, however, was highly critical as to the utility of 
concluding a formal agreement with the Russians. Lie feared the reactions in 
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Norway, and the treaty might also, in his opinion, cause considerable appre-
hension in Sweden and Finland.76 
Consequently Lie told Maisky that the Norwegian government for the 
moment felt it to be unwise, due to "the political situation in Norway", to sign 
a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union. Lie proposed the informal procedure 
of Maisky's sending a letter to Lie proposing to accredit a Soviet minister to 
the Norwegian government. The Norwegians. in their turn, would then make a 
similar proposal to the Russians. Ambassador Maisky accepted the procedure, 
and the corresponding letters were made public on 5th August 1941.77 
Finland: Nordic utlity versus allied solidarity 
As a result of Finland's participation in the war against the Soviet Union on 
Germany's side, the Norwegian government was repeatedly confronted with the 
necessity of choosing between its traditional concern for Scandinavian soli-
darity and unity and its commitment to the Soviet Union as one of the allies. 
We have already noticed the existence of a widespread feeling of sympathy 
towards Finland in Norway, which still further complicated the task of 
balancing the conflicting policy aims of Scandinavian versus allied unity. 
Anxiety as to the reaction in Finland had been one of the factors behind 
the Norwegian decision to reject the Soviet proposal of a Soviet-Norwegian 
treaty. Soon the question of whether the Norwegian government was to uphold 
its diplomatic representation in Finland brought the potential conflict of 
interest into the open. As a matter of fact, to begin with the Norwegians were 
extremely anxious lest the Finns should break the relations with Norway upon 
the outbreak of Finnish-Soviet hostilities.18 The Finnish government, however, 
limited itself to placing certain restrictions on the activity of Norwegian 
diplomats, and the Norwegian legation confirmed its unique position by 
continuing the work at the same time as the representatives of the other 
occupied countries had to leave the country. 
In the course of the summer and the autumn it gradually became clear 
that the Finnish government had no intention of stopping its armies' advance 
along the pre-I939 border. Trygve Lie accordingly began to feel uneasy about 
possible Soviet negative reactions to the continued existence of a Norwegian 
legation in Helsinki. Lie feared that his government would find itself in the 
dubious position of "maintaining diplomatic relations with a government who 
were pursuing aggressive military operations against an ally of their own great 
ally, Great Britain".79 He nonetheless preferred to maintain diplomatic relations 
with Finland, conscious, however, that the Russians might at any moment ask 
the Norwegian government to remove its representatives from Helsinki.8o 
In the middle of September Lie proposed to Collier a joint presentation 
by the Norwegian and the British governments to the Finnish government, 
urging Finland to stop its offensive operations against the Soviet Union and 
withdraw its forces to the line of the pre-1939 frontiers. SI After some 
discussion in the Foreign Office, the British decided to send a message of 
their own through the Norwegian minister in Helsinki, and the two demarches 
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were delivered to the Finnish minister of foreign affairs on 22 September 
1941.S2 
The Norwegian demarche did not specifically mention the Soviet-Finnish 
conflict. and presented itself instead as a somewhat pathetic appeal to Scandi-
navian unity. Lie's reflections on this occasion are symptomatic of the 
ambiguous Norwegian attitude to the alliance with the Soviet Union: 
they [i.e. the Norwegian government} could not refer specifically to the 
1939 frontier of Finland with Russia without exposing themselves to the 
retort that this was no question of theirs, since they were not actually 
allies of the Soviet Union.s3 
During the autumn of 1941, the Soviet government put steadily increasing 
pressure on the British government to declare war on Finland. Anlhony Eden 
and Lie discussed the matter in the middle of November, Lie advising the 
British to take "a strong attitude" toward Finland. Lie reportedly held the view 
that Great Britain would have to declare War on Finland within approximately 
a fortnight if the Finns did nothing to meet the British demands. s• Although 
well aware that this would lead to a break of Norwegian-Finnish relations, Lie 
must have felt that the benefits of keeping the representation in Helsinki had 
to be sacrificed for the sake of allied solidarity. Consequently, when the 
British government finally declared war on Finland on 7th December 1941, the 
Norwegians at once withdrew their legation from Helsinki; a decision which led 
to vehement and bitter protests in Finland and Sweden. 
The Norwegian government continued thereafter to take an interest in 
Finnish affairs, trying on some occasions rather unsuccessfully to act as an 
intermediator between Finland and the Soviet Union, and stressing the 
necessity of restoring Finland after the war as a free and independent coun-
try.S6 Meanwhile, Finland's participation in the war against the Soviet Union 
was to represent an obstacle in the development of Soviet-Norwegian military 
cooperation on the Northern front. 
Norwegian-SoviN military cooperation 
Northern Norway with the county of Finnmark became, not surprisingly, the 
only area were Norway and the Soviet Union were to engage in projects of 
military cooperation during the war. A marked disinterest in Northern Norway 
on the part of Great Britain and the USA contrasted with the obvious Soviet 
interest in an area of Norway which was after the war to border directly on 
the Soviet Union. 
On the Norwegian side there had even before 22nd June 1941 been some 
half-hearted attempts to make military contacts with the Soviet government. 
The possibility of an armed clash between Germany and the Soviet Union on 
Norwegian territory led the High Command in April 1941 to propose sending a 
military attache to Moscow.s6 We have noted above that the Norwegian 
military authorities, on the eve of the German attack on the Soviet Union, 
expected armed operations to take place in Northern Norway in the case of 
war between the Soviet Union and Germany. 
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The Norwegians also made a vain attempt to send a Norwegian officer 
with the British military mission which left for Moscow after the German 
attack,S7 but normal military-diplomatic relations were established only in 
November 1941 when general Wilhelm Steffens was sent as military attache to 
Moscow. As it turned out, the general and his assistant were not unduly busy 
during their stay in the Soviet Union; due to Soviet fondness of secrecy they 
had to limit their activity to the systematic reading of newspapers.88 
During the summer of 1941 the Russians made repeated attempts to get the 
British to engage themselves militarily in the Arctic.89 The Norwegian govern-
ment's actual participation in the discussions was, as it turned out, limited to 
the planning of "Operation Gauntlet", the evacuation of Spitzbergen in 
August/September 1941. The other British naval operations in the Arctic earlier 
that summer were set in motion without the Norwegians being informed at all. 
The Russians were in favour of operations involving infantry as well, and 
proposed the opening of a new front together with the British 1n the Kirkenes 
- Pctsamo - Murmansk area. The operation should eventually lead to the 
liberation of Norwegian territory.9o Maybe in order to soothe the suspicious 
Norwegians, Stalin proposed the despatch of "one light division or more" of 
Norwegian troops from Scotland "for insurgent operations against the Ger-
mans".91 In any case, there existed no Norwegian "light division" or its 
equivalent. 
The Soviet proposals for a joint operation in the Arctic were rejected by 
British military authorities, although the Foreign Office and Churchill himself 
seem to have been positively inclined.92 In 3n attempt to meet some of the 
Russian demands for a more active British support of the Soviet war effort, 
the British government decided instead to send a naval expedition to disturb 
the German shipments of supplies for the Northern front along the Norwegian 
coast. The expedition left Scapa Flow in the middle of July headed by the 
aircraft carriers Furious and ViclOrious, but did not succeed in any of its 
primary operational aims.93 • 
British awareness of the need to give the Russians some kind of substan-
tial military support now led to the exploration of the possibility of a British-
Soviet-Norwegian expedition to Spitzbergen. The original idea was to prepare a 
base of support for the British naval operations against the Germans in the 
Arctic.94 There is no need here for a detailed discussion of the complicated 
process which ultimately resulted in the launching of "Operation Gauntlet" late 
in August 1941.95 We will restrict our discussion to the question of the 
Norwegian government's attitude to the possibility of a Soviet presence on the 
archipelago, and, as far as possible. its evaluation of Soviet intentions with 
their involvement in the area. 
Lie raised the question of eventual Soviet "defensive measures" on 
Spitzbergen during a conversation with Laurence Collier on 25th June. The 
Norwegian minister of foreign affairs obviously feared that the Soviet govern-
ment was going to launch a military action of its own on the archipelago, and 
sought to make it clear to Collier that something had to be done to "defend 
the Norwegian interests" as wel1.96 In the middle of July Lie told the American 
minister to the governmenls-in-exile in London, Anthony Drexcl Biddle. that he 
would view favorably any American request for Norwegian consent to the 
stationing of US troops on Spitzbergcn.97 
There is hardly any doubt lhat the Norwegian government was not at all 
happy with the thought of Soviet participation in an allied military expedition 
to Spitzbergen. Trygve Lie told Anthony Eden that he "was not without a 
suspicion that Russia had ulterior designs on Spitzbergen and hoped thereby to 
secure an outlet for herself on the Atlantic. In other words he had to be 
careful".9s Lie also told Collier that he did not like at all the thought of a 
Soviet force being stationed on Spitzbergen. The rest of the cabinet, according 
to Lie, took a still more uncompromising stance.9g The Norwegian premier later 
wrote that the cabinet was "not at all" delighted at the thought of foreign 
troopS on Spitzbergen: "If the Germans did occupy Spitzbergen they were in 
any case to be ousted some day. Other nations' soldiers might prove harder to 
get removed" .100 
Trygve Lie felt that the stationing of Soviet troops on Spitzbergen was 
likely to provoke negative reactions among people in Norway, and complicate 
further the relations with Swede,n and Finland. A Soviet participation should 
therefore be preceded by an agreement between the Norwegian and Soviet 
governments which would make clear that Norwegian and Soviet forces were 
sent to the island to defend Norwegian territory against German auack, "and 
to prevent the utilization of Spitzbergen as a base for military opcntions".lOl 
The Russians gradually became less enthusiastic about the idea of Soviet 
participation in a military expedition to Spitzbergen, and let it be known that 
they preferred to send specialists to arm and train the Russian mine workers 
in Barentsburg. The Norwegians were dubious about the idea of a military 
occupation of the islands, even with the participation of Norwegian troops, 
since the soldiers would be too vulnerable to German air attacks. On the other 
hand, they were willing to evacuate the Norwegian inhabitants on Spitzbergen 
on the condition that the Russian population was evacuated simultaneously.102 
As it turned out, the Norwegians did not wield any significant influence 
on the further planning of the operations to be set in motion. On 31st July a 
group of British warships under the command of Rear-Admiral Philip Vian 
arrived at Spitzbergen, in order "to prepare a squadron to be based in the 
north to work with the Russians". Vian realized, however, that Spitzbergen was 
no suitable place for an "advanced base" for the British fleet. The Admiralty 
hence decided to drop the more ambitious military plans in favour of an 
evacuation of the ~orwegian and Russian popUlation on the islands. 103 The 
Norwegians were only informed about the British plans on 12th August, and 
"Operation Gauntlet" was launched after Ivan Maisky gave his consent a few 
days later. The Norwegians and Russians were finally evacuated during the 
first days of September 1941. 
Whereas the British engagement in the distant area of Spitzbergen is best 
understood in light of the British' wish to give the Russians some sort of 
visible, active support in their struggle against the Germans, the Norwegian 
government was motivated by the fear of Russian single-handed action to 
defend Soviet interests on the archipelago. There are virtually no signs that 
the Norwegians viewed the Spitzbergen affair as an opportunity to lay the 
foundations for a cooperation with the Soviet governmenl in military and 
political matters. 
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The Norwegian military authorities continued to worry about the possibility of 
Northern Norway becoming a new theatre of operations in the world war. This 
concern was strengthened by repeated Russian inquires about Northern Norway 
during the autumn and winter 1941/1942,104 and by newspaper rumours about 
an imminent Finnish-Soviet separate peace. Molotov at one stage even proposed 
to the Norwegian minister in Moscow, Rolf Andvord, to launch a Soviet-
British-Norwegian operation in Northern Norway.105 
The commander-in-chief of the Norwegian army, general Carl August 
Fleischer. was aware of the possibility of a Soviet offensive through Finland 
into Norwegian territory, and thought the Norwegians had to be prepared for 
this eventuality. Talks ought to be started with Soviet authorities, and 
Norwegian forces should be prepared for immediate despatch to Northern 
Norway in case the Germans did evacuate or in the event of a Soviet offensive 
aiming at Norwegian territory.106 This view was supported by Bjorn Christo-
phersen, chief-or-staff in the Norwegian Defence High Command from February 
1942. Chistophersen particularly stressed the importance of early Norwegian 
participation in the planning of any offensive into Northern Norway.l07 
A memorandum from the Army High Command in January 1942 started a 
discussion about some of the questions related to a possible allied reconquest 
of Finnmark. Such an operation, according to the memorandum, was likely to 
be set in motion as a consequence of the common Soviet-British interests in 
the defence of the transporl lines to Murmansk and Arkhangels. General 
Fleischer, who signed the memorandum. did not view favorably an eventual 
participation of Soviet troops in an allied occupation of Northern Norway. ~in 
the first place because of the doubtless Russian interest in these parIS of 
Norway, secondly because of the propaganda campaign which will be launched 
by the Germans and the quislings in Norway". The use of British, Canadian of 
American troops was ~very much to be preferred".lOB 
A subsequent commentary on the report from the Navy Command conclu-
ded that it was beside the point to discuss the desirability of a Soviet move 
into Norway: the Norwegians would not be in a position to veto such opera-
tions if the Russians deemed them desirable. Consequently, the Navy Command 
argued in favour of early preparation of Norwegian troops for cooperation with 
the Soviet Army in case of operations in Norway.lOg 
Discussions in the Defence Council (Forsvarsnldet, an advisory body to 
the government) revealed a widespread fear of Soviet expansionist intentions in 
the North. The Council decided to ask the British if they felt a Soviet-German 
clash on the north-eastern border of Norway was likely or imminent. If so, and 
in order to forestall such a development, the British would be requested to 
rnal\e arrangements for the launching of a British-Norwegian expedition to lake 
Finnmark.110 A contemporary letter from Crown Prince Olav to president 
Rooseveit leaves the impression of a revival of the traditional "russophobia". 
The Crown Prince warned that there was "a great risk of Russia wanting to 
permanently annex a part of Northern Norway for all tirnes".111 
These outbursts of Norwegian fears of Soviel expansionism receded into 
the background after January and February 1942. The newly elected comman-
der-in-chief of the Norwegian armed forces, general Wilhelrn Hansteen, rounded 
off the discussion by concluding that there might occur situations which would 
demand the immediate action of Norwegian troopS.1l2 
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The first years of the alliance with the Soviet Union saw only limited attempts 
at Soviet-Norwegian cooperation in the military field. During the first six 
months of 1942 an attempt was made to develop a common Norwegian-Soviet 
intelligence network in Northern Norway. The venture ended in disaster. Two 
Norwegian agents were sent to finnmark from the Soviet side in the middle of 
August 1942, but were immediately arrested by the Germans and later ShOt.Ill 
Thereafter there were no signs of Soviet-Norwegian cooperation in the field of 
intelligence. The Russians, however, developed their own set of agents in 
Northern Norway to the great dislike of the Norwegian government in Lon-
don.lH 
Until the last year of the war the Soviet government appeared more 
eager than the Norwegian government to bring about Soviet-Norwegian 
cooperation in military matters. A Soviet diplomat in June 1942 suggested 
discussions :::Jbout an eventual participation of Norwegian troops in the Mur-
mansk area.1lS Some months later Molotov told Rolf Andvord, who had been 
accredited as Norwegian ambassador when the legation in Moscow in August 
1942 was transformed into an embassy, that the Norwegian government ought 
to present some projects of Soviet-Norwegian military cooperation. lI6 This, 
according to Andvord, pointed to an important future role for Northern 
Norway in the war. It also did not go unnoticed in London that a Soviet 
general had told (he Norwegian military attache in Moscow that the Soviet 
high command was interested in all available information about German military 
objects in Norway.1l7 
An exchange of letters in March 1943 between general Hansteen and 
Terje Wo Id leaves the impression that the Question of military cooperation with 
the Soviet Union was then no longer regarded a priority task in the Norwegian 
High Command. Terje Wold, being acutely aware of the possible implications of 
an eventual Soviet move into Norway, would have preferred to forestall this 
eventuality by a western military action in Northern Norway. He feared, 
however, that the liberation of the area was more likely to come from the 
East than from the West. Therefore the Norwegian government had no 
allernative but to seek to develop as far as possible contacts and cooperation 
with the Soviet Union, hoping thereby to secure "the freedom and indepen-
dence of our country in the future".llB 
General Hansteen disagreed with Wold's opinion, and thought that a 
Soviet move into Norway was not likely to take place unless the situation was 
changed by Finland withdrawing from the war. If a Finnish-Soviet peace 
agreement led to Soviet forces crossing the Norwegian border, Hansteen conti-
nued, the participation of Norwegian forces would be of great importance. 
Towards the East the Norwegian soldiers would have to "mark Norwegian 
sovereignty on the border to Finland (Russia)", while fighting the Germans to 
the West. General Hansleen foresaw an arrangement wherebJ! the Soviet 
detachments stopped at the border, leaving it to Norwegian and allied troops 
to continue the offensive to the West and South. 
During 1943 and 1944 new prospects opened Cor the development of 
Soviet-Norwegian military cooperation. The formation of detachments of "police 
troops" in Sweden placed at the disposal of the government military forces 
that were at least formally outside the reach of the military agreement 
between the Norwegian and British governmen~s. The police troops could be 
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moved more freely by the Norwegian government. subject only to acquiescence 
of the Swedish government. 
The decisive factor was still the course of the war between Finland and 
the Soviet Union. Finland being a participant in the war against the Soviet 
Union, the Norwegian government could only send troops to participate on the 
northern front at the cost of placing the relations with the other Nordic 
countries under heavy strain. The prospect of a separate peace agreement 
between the Soviet L'nion and Finland, eventually followed by a Soviet 
offensive against the Germans in the North, made things look different. This 
development ultimately resulted the crossing of the Norwegian-Soviet border by 
Soviet troops in October 1944, thereby beginning the liberation of the country. 
But this still lay in the future. 
Civil cooperation: Norwegian tOllnage to the Soviet Unioll? 
In December 1941 the Soviet minister to the governments-in-exile in London, 
Alexandr Bogomolov, asked Lie if the Norwegian government was willing to 
place at the disposal of the Soviet government 25-30 ships for the transport of 
supplies from USA to the Soviet Union.1l9 The Norwegians, although for the 
moment not willing to bind themselves to any definite agreements, reacted 
favorably to the Russian request. Olav Riste has characterized the Norwegian 
attitude as an early attempt on part of the Norwegian government to infuse 
the relations with the Soviet Union with a positive spirit, thereby preceding 
the later policy of "bridge-building".120 Trygve Lie has also written that the 
government's attitude was dictated by a wish to strengthen and improve the 
bonds with the Soviet Union. I21 This positive spirit was, however, counter-
acted on the one hand by strong British resistance to the proposed agreement, 
and on the other hand by the presence of differing views within the Norwe-
gian government itself and its agencies. 
The Norwegians were not in a position to negotiate with the Russians 
without an eye to the views of their British and American allies. Their single 
most important asset as a meclber of the great alliance was Norway's great 
fleet of modern merchant ships, which is generally ackno ..... ledged to have 
played a crucial role in the battle of the Atlantic. For the duration of the war 
the Norwegian ships had been placed under rhe control of an agency of the 
Norwegian government, Nortraship, and were operated from Nortraship's offices 
in London and New York. The greater part of the ships were placed at the 
disposal of the British government by BritiSh-Norwegian agreements, the so-
called "scheme-ships". The use of these ships were to be agreed upon through 
an Allglo-Norwegiall Shipping Committee in London. The rest of the fleet 
consisted of "free" ships, i.e. ships which were outside the direct control of 
British maritime authorities. 
Lie's answer to Bogomolov's request seems to have suggested the possi-
bility of treating the matter as a Norwegian-Soviet affair, to be solved by 
direct negotiations between the two governments. He obviously had in view 
chartering to the Soviet Union some of the "free" ships not already chartered 
to the British Ministry of War Transport (MOWT).122 This W.iS questioned by 
Arne Sunde, the minister in charge of shipping matters, who held the view 
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that "all questions concerning the disposal of Norwegian ships" were to be 
discussed by the Anglo-Norwegian Shipping Committee.123 Oyvind Lorentzen, 
head of Nortraship, pointed at the great risks involved in the shipping of 
supplies to ports in Northern Russia, and preferred to offer 10 the Soviet 
government ~older scheme-ships" rather than valuable "free" ships. 124 
The British, however, were not inclined to release ships already under 
charter to the MOWT. and were for reasons of their own bent on keeping 
control over the shipping of supplies to the Soviet Union. A separate NOf\.ve-
gian-Soviet agreement would in their opinion result in "hideous confusion" in 
the allied shipping effort.12s The Norwegian government, according to the 
British view, should tell the Russians that all Norwegian tonnage was placed at 
the disposal of the United Kingdom government, subject only to certain 
restrictions securing American interests. 126 
As the Russians continued to raise demands of a separate agreement with 
the Norwegian government, the Norwegians tried to argue that an eventual 
agreement was to include only ships released from British-Norwegian "schemes". 
In an Aide-Afcmoire on 12th January the Norwegian government declared its 
agreement "en principe" to a Norwegian-Soviet agreement, but made it clear 
that all questions regarding the allocation of Norwegian tonnage had to be 
discussed in the Anglo-Norwegian Shipping Committee.127 The Norwegians now 
found themselves in a rather embarrassing situation. For political reaSons they 
were clearly interested in an agreement with the Soviet government, realizing 
that it would serve Norway's long time interests "to be on a friendly footing 
with the Soviet Union in the future".12B Reasons of economy and national 
interest, however, argued in favour of preserving as much as possible of the 
Norwegian tonnage in the more profitable "free" traffic. 
During a conversation with Anthony Eden on 5th January 1942, Lie made 
a strong appeal for the release of a number of Norwegian ships for chartering 
to the Soviet government. I29 Eden was evasive, and was not at all happy when 
Lie later told him that the Norwegian government had made arrangements for 
the transfer of three ships from American trade to the Russians. ISO It is 
important to note that the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs in his 
discussions with Eden laid stress on the possible long-term benefits of a 
Soviet-Norwegian shipping agreement.131 
As a result of the British refusal to consider the release of ships already 
on "scheme", the Norwegians began to consider the possibility of letting an 
agreement include "free" ships as well. Although the British were of the 
opinion that His Majesty's government had priority rights on all Norwegian 
tonnage,132 they finally agreed to an arrangement whereby five ships not in 
British charter should be placed at the disposal of the Soviet government. l3 :! 
On 3rd February the Norwegian cabinet consequently decided to assign to 
Nortraship the task of chartering five ships to the Soviet government.134 
In the meantime the British had arrived at an arrangement with the 
Russians which authorized the British-Soviet Shipping Committee135 to discu55 
even the shipping of supplies to the Soviet Union outside the Moscow proto-
COIS. 13G The Norwegians, having been informed of the discussions between the 
British and )van Maisky since the end of January, decided to await the further 
development of the situation before approaching the Russians with any 
Concrete proposals. The Soviet government, on the other hand, seems to have 
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been satisfied by the Soviet-British arrangement. Alexandr Bogomolov and 
Trygve Lie touched on the matter during a conversation on 3rd March, but the 
Soviet minister limited himself to remark that he was "fully aware- of the 
Norwegian government's efforts lo arrange for transfer of tonnage to the 
Soviet Union.131 
Maisky and Bogamolav returned to the matter in the spring and summer 
of 1943. After some initial hesitation the Norwegians, in an Aide-Meimoire on 
5th August 1943, asked the British to release five Norwegian ships for 
chartering to the Soviet government. 138 The Norwegians again stressed the 
political importance of an eventual Norwegian-Soviet agreement. Laurence 
Collier was of the opinion that the Norwegian government feared that the 
Russians might challenge Norwegian interests in other fields if the two parties 
did not arrive at a solution in the shipping question.t39 Lie stressed the 
importance of an agreement as an example of practical "bridge-building" 
between a small power and one of the great powers, which might in the long 
run prove beneficial even from the point of view of relations between the 
great powers themselves. HO 
Apparently the British then decided to test how far the Norwegians were 
willing in fact to sacrifice other interests in order to come to an arrangement 
with the Russians. Undoubtedly Collier was fully aware that he placed Lie in a 
rather embarrassing situation when he asked whether the Norwegian govern-
ment had contemplated to bring into an arrangement some of the remaining 
"free" ships. Lie had to confess that there were, in fact, some "free" ships, 
but, he continued, "they are our one ewe lamb, the last piece of independent 
bargaining power left to us, and it would be to much too ask us to sacrifice 
that for the Russians",141 This attitude, not surprisingly, produced some 
sarcastic comments among the British about the Norwegians' eagerness to build 
bridges without wanting to cover the costs.H2 The Norwegian government was, 
however. spared the troubles of balancing its opposing interests. Ambassador 
Bogomolov left for Algiers, and the Russians apparently decided for the time 
being to drop the matter, 
In January 1944 Lie on his own initiative called a meeting to discuss the 
question of a Norwegian-Soviet shipping agreement. Lie's motivation was purely 
political. and evolved from his realization of the growing power and influence 
of the Soviet Union. He referred to "the Polish situation", obviously as an 
example of the relative impotence of a small country when confronted by 
Soviet demands, even if that country was backed by Great Britain and the 
USA. Lie apparently cherished the hope that a demonstration of will on part 
of Norway to engage in cooperative ventures would improve her bargaining 
position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The meeting did not lead to any definite 
decisions or initiatives.H3 
The matter was raised for the last time during Lie's visit to Moscow in 
November 1944. Lie came to the conclusion that the Russians still attached 
considerable importance to the question. This time the Norwegian foreign 
minister was quite firm in his decision to reach an agreement with the Soviet 
government. 1H Consequently, after Lies return to London the government made 
arrangements for the transfer or a number of Norwegian ships which had been 
interned in Swedish ports to Soviet charter for use in the Baltic. The British 
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were informed, but saw no reason to oppose the proposed agreement. As it 
turned out, however, the Norwegian offer apparently did not correspond to 
Soviet needs. In the middle of January 1945 the government in Moscow 
declared that the freezing of the Gulf of Finland for the time being excluded 
the movements of ships in the area. U5 
Agreemen' Oil jurisdiction alld civil affairs 
Finland's participation in the war against the Soviet Union was a major 
obsta-cle to the development of a Soviet-Norwegian military cooperation in the 
North. The Norwegian government was bent on avoiding direct confrontation 
between Finnish and Norwegian troops, though the cabinet members realized at 
an early stage in the war that some sort of future Norwegian armed partici-
pation in the war against Finland might prove unavoidable.u6 At the same 
time, a direct Soviet intervention against the Germans in Norway had to be 
preceded by Finland's capitulation or withdrawal from the war. It was also 
clear to the Norwegians that the Soviet government would demand the cession 
of the Petsama (Pechenga) area to the Soviet Union as one of its precon-
ditions for a sepamte peace-agreement with Finland, which would mean the 
restoration of a common Norwegian-Soviet border. This would open (0 the 
Soviets a direct route to attack the German troops and fortifications in 
Eastern Finnmark. 
1n this perspective it is hardly surprising that the Norwegians in London 
were extremely sensitive to any signs of a possible or imminent armistice or 
truce between Finland and the Soviet Union. Johan Michelet, the Norwegian 
minister in Helsinki who left for Stockholm when the legation in Finland was 
closed down in December 1941, kept on sending the government in London 
regular reports about the evolution of Finnish-Soviet relarions. 147 On several 
occasions there had been rumours of Finnish-Soviet negotiations, and the 
Norwegians W(,H" hardly surprised when it became clear during February 1944 
that such talks were in fact going on. In December 1943 ambassador Andvord 
had sent a message to London about signs of an increased Soviet preoccupation 
with the Northern areas.148 One is left with the impression that he expected a 
Soviet offensive on the Northern front to materialize in the near future, 
though the ambassador did not make his fears explicit. The Defence Council 
had discussed the situation in Finland at a meeting in the beginning of 
December 1943, with a view to what had to be done to secure Norwegian 
interests in case, of a Soviet-Finnish agreement. 149 At approximately the same 
time Erik Colban discussed the matter with Sir Alexander Cadogan, trying to 
convey to the under-secretary of state the need to prepare the despatch of 
allied (i.e. western) troops to Northern Norway. A Soviet invasion in Norway, 
Sir Cadogan was told, would not be in the interest of either Norway or Great 
Britain. ISO Finally, the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs was alarmed by 
an article in Sllnday TinU!J on 23rd January 1944, which discussed the pro-
spects of a Finnish-Soviet armistice and a consequent SoviN move into 
Northern Norway.I51 The members of the cabinet now realized that the near 
future might confront them with what had so far been only a distant, though 
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far from pleasant, possibility: the presence of Soviet soldiers on Norwegian 
soil.152 
The basis of the government's planning and policy formulation for the 
ultimate liberation of Norway was the supposition that this task would be left 
to Norwegian troops in cooperation with their western allies. The presumed 
agreement between the "big three" about Norway as an exclusive western zone 
of operations may be traced back to a remark by Anthony Eden to Lie in 
January 1942, after Eden's return from his first visit to Moscow. According to 
Lie's minutes from the conversation, Eden made a point of stressing that Stalin 
had explicitly renounced any Soviet demands on Norway. Stalin had also made 
it clear that the Soviet Union would not object to Norway's participation in a 
western oriented security system. 153 Lie apparently interpreted this as implying 
that Norway was to belong to the zone of operations of the western powers 
during the war as well, although no such explicit and authoritative statement 
had been made. 
Developments on the Northern front raised questions as to the validity of 
the supposed agreement that Norway was a in the zone of operations of the 
western allies. Lie raised the question with Eden on 21st December 1943, 
referring to their conversation in January 1942. Quite apart from signs of an 
imminent Soviet offensive in the North, Lie was also alarmed by the signing of 
the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement on 12th December. The Soviets, Eden was 
told, might possibly want to sign a similar agreement with the Norwegian 
government, since Norway and the Soviet Union would probably become 
neighbouring stateS. Anthony Eden, however, was not able or willing la give a 
definite answer.1S4-
After the article in Sunday Times Lie again requested clarification of the 
issue, without succeeding. As a result, Lies and his colleagues in the cabinet 
were coming to realize that a Soviet move into Northern Norway was no 
longer outside the range of possibility or even of probability.155 The govern-
ment had to act accordingly. 
Already in the spring of 1943 the Norwegian and the British governments 
had started talks about an agreement on jurisdiction and civil administration in 
liberated territories in Norway in case of an allied military reconquest. 
Agreement on the text of the document was reached in the summer the same 
year, and during the next months the US government agreed in principle to a 
similar agreement with the Norwegians. As it turned out, however, the British 
and the Americans were in no hurry to finalize the agreement. 
Now the Norwegian government began to consider concluding an agree-
ment with the Russians as well. Lie first asked the British to supply the Soviet 
government with information about the agreement,156 obviously hoping to 
ensure that the Soviets would apply and respect the stipulations of the 
agreement if their soldiers crossed the Soviet-Norwegian border. The Soviets, 
however, were in no hurry to give official approval of the text of the 
proposed Norwegian-British and Norwegian-American agreements. 
The Norwegians had a double set of motives in this affair. On the onc 
hand, they had been constantly pressing the British and the Americans to sign 
the agreement as soon as possible. On the other hand, there was the necessity 
of bringing into the open the Soviet attitude. Lie had told the Foreign Office 
that the Norwegian government might feel obliged to start talks with the 
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Soviet government in order to safeguard Norwegian interests in case of a 
Soviet invasion of Norway, if the supposed agreement about Norway us a 
western sphere of operations was in fact non-existent.1S1 Asking them to 
await the Soviet reaction to the text of the proposed Norwegian-British 
agreement, the British attempted to discourage the Norwegians from taking any 
definite steps in the direction of a separate agreement with the Soviet Union. 
Lie grudgingly consented, but added that the British government was respon-
sible for the situation which would arise "if Russian troops appeared on 
Norwegian territory".158 
Some days later Lie conveyed to Mikhail Lebedev, the new Soviet 
ambassador 10 the Norwegian government, the first hints that he might be 
interested in a separate Norwegian-Soviet agreement. Pointing to the fact that 
there had been talks of an agreement only with the British and US govern-
ments, he said: "[We] had got the (impression that Norway was part of the 
Anglo-American sphere of operatio'ns, and that consequently Russian troops 
were not to be used on Norwegian soil. If this assumption does not hold good, 
we will have to reconsider the matter."159 
The Norwegian strategy at this juncture seems to have been as follows. 
On the one hand, Lie and his colleagues were doing their best to ensure that 
the liberation of Norway would be the task of Norwegian and Anglo-American 
troops. They made repeated attempts to convince the western allies of the 
necessity of planning for intervention in Northern Norway in Case of a German 
evacuation or withdrawal. Otherwise, Lie argued, the German evacuation of 
Northern Finland, and possibly parts of Northern Norway as well, might result 
in a Soviet penetration "deep into Norwegian territory".160 On the other hand, 
the prospect of the Soviets being the first of the big allies to start regular 
operations against the Germans in Norway seemed no less probable than an 
invasion from the West. In that case agreements with the western powers 
would be of only limited value, unless the Soviet government undertook to 
"give them its sanction and respect their stipulations if Russian troops moved 
into Norwegian territory".161 Trygve Lie, in fact, argued that the presence of 
Soviet troops in Norway would make the signing of a separate agreement with 
the Russians unavoidable. 162 
On 8th March 1944 Lie took another step towards an agree,ment on 
jurisdiction and civil administration with the Soviet governmenl. Contrary to 
his assurances 10 Collier the day before that he would not press the matter 
with the Russians,163 he told Lebedev that "in the case of Soviet participation 
in the liberation of Norway from German occupation. [ ... ] we would want an 
agreement with the Russians similar to those which we had reached with the 
British and the Americans", Lebedev, however, avoided committing himself, by 
countering that the Soviet Union, in view of its many commitments elsewhere, 
was hardly in a position to offer assistance in the liberation of Norway,llH 
During a conversation with Lebedev on 22nd April Lie reminded the 
Soviet ambassador of their earlier talks on the subject, and told him bluntly 
that the Norwegian government wanted agreements with all countries which 
were to participate with troops in the liberation of Norway, On Lebedev's 
request Lie confirmed that he wanted the initiation of Soviet-Norwegian 
negotialions. 165 The formal request from the Norwegian government to start 
negotiations was sent three d:Jys later. The message pointed to the uncertainty 
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as to "whether the supposed understanding between the three great powers for 
operations in Norway was actually arrived at and in that case whether it is 
still valid or whether some other arrangements have been made".l66 No real 
negotiations, however, took place. Lie simply sent ambassador Lebedev a 
proposed text of the agreement, similar to the Norwegian-British one. On 13th 
May Lcbedev handed to Lie an Aide-Memoire whereby the Soviet government 
agreed to sign the lext without any aiterations.167 The three agreements with 
Great Britain, USA and the Soviet Union were signed on 16th May 1944. 
The agreement with the Soviet Union came about as a result of an 
initiative on part of the Norwegian government. The British were informed of 
Lie's decisive move only on 4th May, i.e. when the Soviets had already 
accepted the Norwegian offer. And the British, to be sure, were rather 
unhappy about the whole matter. 168 The Norwegian policy may be viewed as an 
example of practical ~bridge-building". It should be noted, however, that the 
Norwegians, when deciding to open negotiations with the Russians, were guided 
primarily by their fear of possible Soviet expansionist intentions in Norway. 
The Norwegian policy, furthermore, did not signify a loosening of the country's 
ties to the western powers. When viewing the signing of the Norwegian-Soviet 
agreement on jurisdiction and civil administration in liberated Norway as an 
example of "bridge-building~. one should avoid the misconception of Norway 
occupying a middle position between the Soviet Union and the western powers. 
Norwegiall troops to the Soviet Union? March 1944 
The question of sending Norwegian troops to Soviet territory, which was raised 
during March 1944, was an additional attempt on the part of the Norwegian 
government to safeguard Norwegian interests and territorial integrity. The 
military attache in Moscow, general Steffens, held the view that the presence 
of a more than token Norwegian force would be of the greatest "strategic, 
political and psychological importance" if Soviet troops were to move into 
Norway.169 The message from general Steffens, together with a similar message 
from ambassador Andvord, prompted the government to undertake an explo-
ration of the Russian attitude to the idea of forming contingents of Norwegian 
troops on Soviet soil. 170 
Three sets of motives on part of the Norwegian government deserve 
mentioning. Foremost in the minds of the decision-makers was the need to 
safeguard Norwegian interests and territorial integrity. Simultaneously, the 
Norwegians were eager to prevent the formation of contingents of Norwegian 
volunteers in the Soviet Union outside the control of the government. There 
had been repeated reports about detachments of "partisans" operating against 
the Germans in the Murmansk area, and Lie and his colleagues feared that 
refugees from Sweden might now join these forces. Secondly, the government 
had to take into account Norwegian public opinion in Norway and Sweden. It 
had to give proof of its determination to enhance Norway's military effort 
with all the means at its disposal. The third motive was a more subtle one. 
The Norwegians cherished the hope that the prospects of a transfer of 
Norwegian manpower to the Soviet Union might prompt the western allies to 
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give higher priority to the transport of Norwegians from Sweden to the British 
isles. This question had loomed large in the discussions between Lie and 
representatives of the British and American governments since the autumn of 
1943. 
Lie presented the idea to Lebedev on 8th March, and the Soviet ambas-
sador returned a highly positive reply from the Soviet government a week 
later. Whereas the Norwegians had cautiously spoken of sending a force of 
about thousand men, i.e. a battalion, the Soviets declared themselves ready to 
accept a force of several battalions, or even a division. Lebedev furthermore 
declared that the arrangement "from the political point on view" had the 
approval of the Moscow authorities, and advised Lie to pursue the matter 
through the Norwegian embassy in Moscow. l71 
For the time being, no presentations seem to have been made in 
Moscow. Norwegian military authorities were far from enthusiastic about the 
idea. I72 More important was the course of events on the Finnish-Soviet front. 
The Norwegians had contemplated the plan to be executed in the event of an 
armistice between Finland and the Soviet Union. In the course of Mnrch and 
April it became clear that the no separate peace agreement was forthcoming in 
the near future, and Lie decided to postpone the execution of the phn. 
36 
The Soviet Union in Norwegian Foreign Policy. 
June 1941 - May 1944 
The entry of the Soviet Union into the war on the allied side was bound to 
have an effect on the general orientation of the foreign policy of the Norwe-
gian government. So far we have studied some attempts after June 194 I at 
establishing cooperation in military matters and in shipping. On the following 
pages we will turn Our attention to a more general analysis of the position of 
the Soviet Union in Norwegian foreign policy thinking in the same period, Le. 
until the winter 1943/1944. 
We have already mentioned that the general uncertainty with regard to 
Soviet intentions in the realm of foreign policy made itself felt when the 
Norwegian politicians set out to include that country in their long-term foreign 
policy planning. It goes without saying that the Norwegians, even before the 
German atlack on nnd June 1941, were perfectly aware of the potentiaJly 
decisive role of the Soviet Union in deciding the course of the war and the 
future shape of Europe. But nobody knew how and in what direction this 
influence was going to manifest itself. 
22nd June 194 J gave only partial answers to these questions. The entrance 
of the Soviet Union into the war on the allied side made it possible for the 
Norwegians to envisage an alliance and war policy which included that country. 
The Norwegian government had to adjust its former policy of exclusive reliance 
on (he western powers to the new situation. On the one hand, Norway would 
try to develop its own relations with the Soviet Union, not least in the field 
of military matters. On the other hand, the Norwegian government was 
perfectly aware that the course and duration of the war would to no small 
degree depend on the relations between the western powers and their new 
great ally. Thus, it appeared to be in Norway's own interest to contribute, 
with the limited means at its disposal, to a positive development of the 
relationship between the three great allied powers. 
In the longer Derspective, Le. for the period after the cnd of the war, 
the basic uncertainty as to Soviet intentions remained. Even in this perspec-
tive, however. the crucial question remained the same, namely the evolution of 
the relationship between Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Consequently, it appeared to be in the obvious interest of Norway to 
assume the role of "bridge-builder" between the great powers even after the 
war. In this respect, Norwegian foreign policy aimed at safeguarding Norwegian 
interests by contributing to the peaceful solution of future potential conflicts 
between the great powers. 
Towards a polic), of "bridge-building"? 
Beginning after the German attack in June 1941 Nonl\. Tidefld continually 
stressed the existence of an atmosphere of "friendl y cooperation" between the 
great powers as the single most important prerequisite for Norway's security in 
the post-war world. In this respect, the official view of the Norwegian govecn-
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ment was basically fixed for the duration of the war already by the summer of 
1941. In his article in The Times on 14th November 1941 Lie declared that 
the most important basis for extended international cooperation in the 
future is an amicable relationship between the British Empire. the United 
States, Soviet Russia, and China. 
Norway was seen as occupying a position particularly well suited to the task 
of acting as a "bridge" between the Soviet Union and the western powers. 
HOl'cdlillja i norsk 11lCnribipofifikk (The principal /t'alures 0/ NorwilY's foreign 
policy), the government's official policy programme from May 1942, reiterated 
these views. This line of thought manifested itself towards the end of the war 
most clearly in the Norwegian government's active support of the planned new 
global security orgnniz3tion. 173 Such a policy of "collective security" was 
hardly compatible with open support of the idea of regional defence arrange-
ments. 
On this declaratory level the "bridge-building" doctrine also asserted itself 
through an increased emphasis on [he importance or Norway's relations with 
the Soviet Union, while simultaneously loosening the one-sided ties to the 
western powers. 
It must be noted, however, that the Norwegians were bent on expressing 
their will for "bridge-building" not only on the purely declaratory level. Their 
policy towards Finland during the autumn of 1941, for instance, went far in 
sacrificing traditional Nordic unity for the sake of expressing solidarity with 
the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1942 there was even a suggestion of 
declaring war on Finland; an idea which was however rejected outright by Lie 
and his principal advisors. 174 In general, the Norwegians were unwilling to 
commit themselves to foreign policy projects, even for the post-war period, 
which might be unwelcome in Moscow. This manifested itself clearly in the 
discussions in 1942 about Nordic and European cooperation after the war.175 
The question of allocating Norwegian vessels to the Soviet Union, on the other 
hand, shows the conflicting interests which made themselves felt when [he 
ideology or "bridge-building" was lO be opcmtionalizcd. 
Not only when it came to cooperation with the Soviet Union, but even 
more with respect to any attempts at "bridge-building", it was necessary first 
10 reevaluatc and reinterpret certain aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign 
policies. Norwegian public opinion in London and in Norway had to be presen-
ted with an analysis of Soviet policies contrary to the image shaped by the 
terror in the thirties and by Stalin's expansionist foreign policy during the 
first year of the world war. The government was confronted with the formi-
dable task of advocating cooperation with a great power which until the 
summer of 1941 had hardly enjoyed greater popularity among most Norwegians 
than Hitler's Germany, More attention was paid to Soviet foreign policy than 
to its domestic policies. Nonk Tidelld limited its comments on the latter 
subject to expressions of hopes for a future development in the direction of 
democratic reforms. The Soviet system was explained as resulting from 
"particular hislorical and social preconditions", alien to Western Europe.176 
The reev:llu:ltion or Soviet foreign policy, on the other hand. regularly 
reappeared as a subject in Nonk Tidelld. beginning in July 1941. The general 
task was to give an explanation of the Soviet policy from August 1939 to June 
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1941 which dispelled the familiar image of the country as an aggressor on line 
with Germany. To Norwegians, however. the policy of the Soviet Union against 
Finland was the single most important obstacle. More than anything else. the 
war against Finland in the winter of 1939/40 had made the Soviet Union 
unpopular among Norwegians. 
Lie's principal advisor, Or Acne Ording, gave the lead by an article in 
Non!.: Tidelld on 8th July 1941. According to Ording, the principal interests of 
the Soviet Union and Germany were fundamentally contrary to each other. 
Their cooperation after August 1939 was from both sides dictated by tactical 
considerations, with the Soviet Union wanting to postpone and gather strength 
for the unavoidable clash with Germany. The Soviet demands towards Finland 
had been motivated by strategic considerations, and no Soviet demands had 
ever been raised as regards Norway.l77 Some months later Ording went even 
further, stating that the Soviet ultimatum to Finland in 1939 was based on 
"good strategic reasons". Norsk Tidelld stated that the Soviet Union right from 
the moment of the German attack on 9th April 1940 had been benevolently 
inclined towards Norway. The rupture of diplomatic relations in May 1941, 
furthermore, was prompted by developments outside the purview of Norwegian-
Soviet relations.17B 
Rolf Andvord, the minister and later ambassador to Moscow, distinguished 
himself as an ardent admirer of Joseph Stalin and the accomplishments of the 
Soviet system, especially with regard to military matters. His reports, beginning 
in the winter of 1941, were increasingly optimistic in their evaluations of the 
direction of Soviet domestic and foreign policies. 179 It is hard to establish to 
what degree his views were influential in London. But they are of interest as 
an example of a mood of enthusiasm for everything Soviet which swept the 
western world during the years following the entrance of the Soviet Union 
into the war. 
COlltinued preference for regiollal agn'emellls? 
The German attack on the Soviet Union did not immediately turn the foreign 
policy programme of the Norwegian government away from the principles of 
post-war Atlantic cooperation in matters of security. In a radio speech on 28th 
June Lie reiterated and elaborated the already known arguments, making a 
point of presenting Norway's future in light of cooperation with Great Britain 
and the USA. At the same time the speech made only a short and compa-
ratively cautious reference to the fact of the Soviet Union's entrance into the 
war. IBO The Norwegians were apparently, like their allies, uncertain as to the 
endurance of the Red Army's resistance to the German assaults. In an article 
in The Times on 14th November Lie repeated and further developed the 
familiar arguments. The Norwegians, according to Lie, were an Atlantic people, 
and their primary concern was to establish cooperation with the Atlantic great 
powers, Great Britain and the USA. The foundations for cooperation were 
already laid by the military struggle against the common enemy. Lie continued: 
Such military cooperation, however, should be developed to continue in 
the future. An agreement should be reached for all the Allied countries to 
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take over certain duties. As far as the smaller states are concerned, 
these duties should be primarily regional. For Norway it seems natural to 
think of the defence of the Atlantic and strongly to emphasize our desire 
to see the United States participating in this task.1BI 
Norway's relations with the Soviet Union were, on the other hand, described 
as being of a traditionally good, neighborly character, and the two countries 
had been engaged in no serious conflicts which each other.1Bz 
A multitude of factors worked in favour of cooperation with the West: 
traditional economic and cultural contacts, a common ideological base, common 
ideals etc. As regards relations with the Soviet Union, the Norwegian politi-
cians were confronted with the absence, or even the negation of all this. 
Norwegian-Soviet cooperative ventures. during the war as well as in the post-
war period, could only materialize if the Norwegians had a clear idea of the 
benefits of involving the Soviet Union in solving particular tasks. This, no 
doubt, waS not the case with regard to the planned defence of the North 
Atlantic. Quite the contrary, the Norwegian government itself cherished 
suspicions as to the Soviet Union's own designs in the northern areas. We 
have already noted the appearance of similar tendencies during the discussions 
about Spitzbergen in the summer of 1941. Later that year Lie alluded clearly 
to a possible future Soviet threat during a conversation with the Dutch and 
Belgian ministers of foreign affairs. Lie pointed to Norway's primarily western 
orientation, and added that 
Germany is not necessarily the only possible source of threat to Europe. 
Even though the Soviet Union has declared that they do not harbour 
territorial demands, Russia's policy towards Finland during the last years 
point in a western direction, and there has been writings about Russian 
designs for a port on the Atlantic. 1B3 
If this was part of the motivation behind Lie's Atlantic policy, it could hardly 
have been the intentions of the Norwegian government to include the Soviet 
Union in the system_ He had been thinking of Russia, I.ie Inld Eden nt about 
the same time, 
but he did not want Russia in the North Atlantic; though he also thought 
Russia would want to be there. Part of his purpose in proposing an 
Anglo-Norwegian and, if possible, American defensive plan for the North 
Atlantic was to be all prepared were Russia to present any demands.184 
Arne Ording argued along similar lines, pointing to the exposed position of 
particularly Northern Norway in case of an aggressive Soviet foreign policy 
leading to "a new period of arms race and formation of alliances", Ording 
concluded that only Great Britain and the USA were in a position to provide 
security for Norwegian independence. "No other form of absolute security 
exists, at least not in the foreseeable future."185 An official committee for the 
planning of Norway's post-war defence concluded in March 1942 that an 
aggressive Soviet policy might reassert itself after the war. Norway's defence 
had consequently to be planned with an eye to this alternative as weli. 18G 
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware of the possibility of 
Soviet objections to Norway's participation in a western-dominated defence 
system in the Atlantic. ArIie Ording, commenting in June 1941 uDon a Dutch 
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proposal of similar content, pointed to Norway's special position vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union. After the war Norway and the Soviet Union would in all 
probability become neighbours. Ording did not exclude the possibility of the 
Soviet Union assuming a favorable attitude towards Norwegian participation in 
a defence system together with Great Britain and the USA. "This is, however", 
Ording continued, "the most sensitive Question arising as a result of the 
proposed agreement". 
The Foreign Office was acutely aware that the Soviet Union was likely to 
put obstacles in the way of any realization of Lie's plans for a North Atlantic 
defence system. The Russians were expected to raise objections to discussions 
of the plan between Norway and the western powers without Soviet partici-
pation. Eden's primary concern was to avoid elements of friction in the 
relations between the great powers.1S1 Consequently, the Soviet Union must 
eventually be invited to participate in the discussions, though Eden feared that 
its contribution would be "entirely destructive": 
It is probable that their [i.e. The Soviet Union's1 line would be that it is 
also a Russian interest to participate in the defence of the Atlantic, and 
that for this purpose Russia must have an ice-free base in Northern Nor-
way.IBB 
Eden's visit to Moscow in December 1941 did much to weaken the fear of 
Soviet territorial ambitions in Norway, at least in British government circles. 
Stalin told Eden that the Soviet Union would not object to the British 
acquiring military bases in Norway after the war. Apparently Stalin at that 
time viewed Norway as belonging to a western sphere of interests. Eden 
conveyed Stalin's assurances to Lie during a conversation on 5th January 1942. 
Eden tried to convince the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs that the fear 
of Soviet demands for bases or ports in Norway was groundless. Eden also told 
him, according to Lie's own minute, that 
Stalin had said in plain words that he would not object to the conclusion 
of agreements between the Atlantic countries on a system of common 
defence of the North Atlantic, which might be joined by I\'orway as 
well. tB9 
Eden's assurances did not, however, put an end to the Norwegian fear of 
sinister Soviet intentions in the North. "Russophobia" continued as one of the 
determining factors behind Norway's policy towards the Soviet Union. 
"The principal features of NorwQ.V's foreigll policy" 
The document The principal features of Norway's foreign policy (Hovedlil1jer i 
lIorsk ulcnrikspolilikk I90 ), which was finally approved by the cabinet on 8th 
May 1942, was an answer to growing opposition to the foreign policy of the 
Norwegian government. In particular, the Norwegians were intent on defining 
the official view of the government with regard to the heated discussions 
about the forms of post-war Nordic cooperation. A similar but separate 
discussion with the Polish government playing the leading part concerned the 
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future political organization of Central Europe from Scandinavia to the 
Balkans. Hl1 
The principal fealures of Norway's foreign policy concluded that a future 
world organization would not in itself, at least not in the foreseeable future, 
have the power to safeguard the security of nations. This would be the case 
only if the great powerS renounced part of their powers to a world govern-
ment, their armed forces being dissolved and replaced by an "international 
police force". Thus the need for regional defence arrangements was thought to 
remain. Within the framework of regional defence systems. Norway would opt 
for participation in an arrangement for the defence of the North Atlantic. 
Norway's future relations with the Soviet Union was seen as depending 
first of all on how the relations between the Soviet Union and the western 
powers developed after the war, but The principal features of Norway's foreigll 
policy leaves no doubt as to the Norwegian government's intention not to 
include the Soviet Union in the Atlantic defence system. The United States, 
Great Britain and Norway should form the nucleus of the arrangement. It might 
also include Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Iceland, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
France. The plan, in fact, looked like a blueprint for a block of the countries 
in north-western Europe and North America. 
A first draft of the document was discussed at a cabinet meeting on 24th 
April 1942. The final version, which was approved by the cabinet on 8th May, 
differed from the draft by more strongly stressing Norway's relations to the 
Nordic countries and by emphasising the importance of the future world 
organization. The discussion revealed the absence of unanimous support among 
the members for the cabinet of Lie's Atlantic orientation. Some voices held 
that the policy recommendations of the document meant "an invitation to 
block-formation", leaving Norway as a "buffer-state" between the Soviet Union 
and the western powers.192 
The pillcipai features of Norway's foreign policy was not made public, but the 
diplomatic representatives of the great powers were informed of the content of 
the document. Great Britain and the USA did not feel it convenient or 
necessary to give an official answer. The Norwegians were therefore rather 
embarrassed when the Soviet ambassador on 24th September 1942 delivered a 
Soviet memorandum193 in answer to the Norwegian document. The Soviet 
memorandum stated that the Soviet Union would be an active partner in all 
ventures to safeguard the future peace. With reference to the Soviet agreement 
with Great Britain from 26th May 1942 the document held forth: 
the Soviet Union, even in virtue of its geographical position cannot be 
uninterested in those problems of providing security of communication and 
preventing aggression which were concerned in the above mentioned 
Memorandum of the Royal Norwegian Government. 
The Norwegians were not at all happy about the Russian memorandum. They 
had cherished the hope that the Soviets, like the British and the Americans, 
would refrain from giving an official commentary.194 Lie, according 10 Anthony 
Eden, "seemed considerably perturbed at the idea of the Russians interesting 
themselves in the Atlantic at all".195 Lie told Collier that he feared, "from his 
42 
own and other people's experiences of Soviet methods", that the Soviet Union 
would demand to be included in the Atlantic arrangement. "If only", Lie 
explained to Collier, "your authorities had not taken such a long time to 
consider my original proposals, we might have avoided this danger."196 
Lie was anxious that the Russians might present "unacceptable demands". 
What he really feared, Collier noted, was Soviet demands for the use of bases 
in Northern Norway. Lie and Collier agreed, however, that the Soviet memo-
randum called for no reply, and they decided to proceed on the assumption 
that the Soviet government had no right "to object to the Powers immediately 
interested in Atlantic defence making provisional arrangements for that defence 
in the post-war period, without bringing them [i.e. the Soviet Union] into the 
discussions".197 
We have already noted that the Norwegians were aware of the possibility 
of the Russians wanting to participate in the Atlantic system. The Norwegian 
government had, according to Arne Ording, realized this eventuality long 
ago.19B Ording's reflections in his diary show that the task of combining the 
Atlantic policy with the declared intention of Norway to act as a "bridge" 
between the great powers was becoming increasingly difficult: 
The Russians have indicated that they take an interest in our Atlantic 
policy. Then we may be confronted with the following choice: either to 
offer bases only to the English and the Americans, which may be received 
by the Russians as a challenge, or to offet bases to the Russians as well, 
an alternative which will create strategic as well as domestic policy 
problems. Or we might conduct a new kind of neutrality policy, trying to 
balance between the western powers and the Soviet Union in the way we, 
with the well-known and dismal result, tried to balance between Germany 
and the western powers.199 
The Atlantic policY, as set out in Principal features, met with criticism from 
the leaders of the Norwegian resistance movement. The Home front, like the 
opposition in the cabinet, was particularly intent on stressing the importance 
of cooperation within the future world organization. and also the relations 
with the other Nordic countdes. The leaders of the Home front did not object 
to the view that regional economic and military organizations might prove 
indispensable until the world organization had proved effective. In Norway's 
case this would primarily mean cooperation with Great Britain, but the Home 
Front added that the Soviet Union had to be included in the cooperation even 
at lhe preparatory stage.:lOO This was, as shown above, quite contrary to the 
government's view. The apparent consensus on the necessity of regional 
agreements in the post-war period was thus seemingly contradicted by a 
fundamental disagreement on the nature of Norway's relations with the Soviet 
Union and the western powers after the war. 
Elements of friction in Norwegian-Soviet rdations 
The Norwegian policy towards the Soviet Union after 22nd June 1941, aiming 
at dispelling previous antagonisms, sought to lay the foundations for war-time 
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cooperation and a positive development of mutual relations in the post-war 
period. We have seen evidence, however, of continued Norwegian uncertainty 
and anxiety as lo Soviet intentions in the North. Some incidents may have 
served to reinforce these tendencies. 
At the end of September 1942, the leaders of the Home Front requested 
the government to ask the Soviets to induce Norwegian Communist resistance 
groups to stop the launching of "isolated acts of terror". These groups were 
outside the control of the Home Front leadership, and their activity, according 
to the Home Front, resulted in heavy German reprisals completely out of 
proportion to the limited value of the gains obtained. The Home Front was of 
the opinion that the Communists even received their orders from Moscow. 20! 
The government acted quickly to the Home Front's request. On 5th 
September Bogomolov received an Aide-Memoire whereby the Norwegian 
government urgently asked the Soviet government to induce the Communist 
resistance groups to stop further isolated acts of terror.202 Neither Bogomolov 
nor Molotov, who discussed the matter with ambassador Rolf Andvord, gave a 
clear-cut answer to the Norwegian request. Molotov, however, promised to 
cooperate with the Norwegian government. 203 Thereafter the Question of the 
Communist resistance activity in Norway was never again raised as a diplomatic 
matter between the two governments. Nor was Lie and his government willing 
to discuss with the Russians the broadcasts of the Moscow-based Fotkescnderell 
Norges Frihel (The People's Radio Norway's Freedom), whkh in its broadcasts 
to Norway disregarded the directives of the Home Front. 
The suggestion of Norway offering free ports in Northern Norway to the 
Soviet Union, which was raised by president Roosevelt during Lie's visit to 
Washington in the spring of 1943, was hardly designed to weaken the inherent 
Norwegian fear of Soviet expansionist tendencies in the North. The Norwegians 
were extremely sensitive to any suggestions that the Soviet Union might have 
special interests in Northern Scandinavia. A Polish booklet from December 
1942, The Ballic, Britain and Peace, for instance, created considerable conster-
nntion among the Norwegians. Rowmund Pilsudski, the author of the booklet, 
wrote La. that "Russia's policy of developing her northern access 10 the 
Atlantic through the unfrozen Arctic ports of Scandinavia is comprehen-
sible".204 
President Roosevelt aired his idea of offering to the Soviet Union the use 
of a free port in Northern Norway during a conversation with Lie on 12th 
March 1943.205 According to Lie, Roosevelt told him that the Russians were 
interested in ports in Northern Norway "with railway connections to the Soviet 
Union''.206 Lie apparently felt his fears as to Soviet intentions in the North 
confirmed by the president's proposal, and reacted accordingly. A message by 
Lie to Johan Nygaardsvold contained the following phrases: 
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The question thus raised presents itself to the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
as the most serious one confronting the Government since its arrival in 
London. [ ... ] With all the means at our disposal we shall have to counter-
act the Russian efforts to acquire ports in Northern Norway. We must not 
even allow a discussion to commence about the establishment of free 
ports and must refuse to participate in any discussions about a linking up 
of our railways with those of the Soviet Union.:201 
The first reaction of Arne Ording was no less vehement: 
Sinister perspectives. One cannot avoid the image of a new war and 
Norway either as a theatre of war or betrayed by a new Munich. In any 
case this question will cast a shadow on us in the future.:208 
Subsequent talks between Crown Prince Olav and the president, however, made 
it fairly clear that the Soviet government had presented no demands for ports 
in Northern Norway. Lie sent some comforting messages to London,209 and 
Ording noted in his diary that the whole matter was "hypothetical" and the 
president's own idea.no 
The question of offering free ports in Northern Norway to the Soviet 
Union never again became a diplomatic issue between Norway and her allies. 
But the fear of Russian expansionism towards ice-free ports in Northern 
Scandinavia did not originate in March 1943. Thus, the traditional "russophobia" 
remained one of the factors determining Norway's policy towards the Soviet 
Union. 
Norway, the Soviet Uniol/, and regional arrangements ;1/ Europe 
Norway's direct intercourse with the Soviet Union was, even in the midst of 
war against Germany, only of limited scope and depth. Some additional light 
may be thrown on the Norwegian atthude to the Soviet Union, by examining 
how considerations of assumed Soviet policy preferences were factors contri-
buting to the formation of Norwegian policy in matters outside the purview of 
purely Norwegian-Soviet relations. This "indirect" approach may be helpful in 
giving an idea of what the Norwegian government regarded as "assumed Soviet 
policy preferencesH , and also of its way of adjusting to expectations of Soviet 
approval or disapproval of a given policy. 
A major foreign policy aim of the Polish government-in-exile of general 
Wladyslaw Sikorski was the creation of a system of federations or confede-
rations in Central Europe for the post-war period, A Czechoslovak-Polish 
confederation was to form the nucleus of the system, which, however, could be 
expanded to include countries from the Scandinavian peninsula to the Bal-
kans. 211 The Norwegian government chose from the outset to take an out-
spokenly negative stance towards the Polish projects. Norway was not intended 
to play an important role in general Sikorskj's planned Central European 
system. The Norwegian government was, on the other hand, inclined to take 
only a limited interest in continental European affairs. Why then did the 
Norwegians not content themselves with expressing their disinterest il1 general 
Sikorski's projects. but felt the need to campaign actively against them?212 
The Norwegian government felt that the evolution of relations between 
the great powers would in the short as well as in the longer run be the factor 
determining Norway's security, Any future conflict between the great powers 
might be expected to leave Norway only a small chance of not being dragged 
in. The Norwegian government consequently tended to oppose planned arrange-
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ments which one of the great powers could be expected to view with suspicion. 
In the case in point, the Norwegians had good reasons to believe that Sikor-
ski's projects were in fact not only directed against Germany, as was officially 
proclaimed,2l3 but were equally aimed at meeting a possible future Soviet 
threat. Lie and his government were of the opinion that the Soviet Union 
would oppose all projects of forming independent small-stale unions or 
confederations in east-central Europe. This kind of planning would conse-
quently expose the inter-allied cooperation to serious strains, and could give 
rise to tension after the war as welI.2u The Norwegians were also aware of 
the negative Soviet attitude to the planned Polish-Czechoslovak confede-
ration. 2I5 The available evidence seems to suggest that expectations of Soviet 
opposition to the projects, which in turn might give rise to tension and 
conflicts between the great powers, were the single most important cause of 
the Norwegian government's negative attitude to the Polish plans for east-
central Europe. 
In February J 942 general Sikorski presented Trygve Lie and Johan 
Nygaardsvold with the idea of issuing a declaration on behalf of the govern-
ments-in-exile of the eight occupied countries in Europe. The declaration, 
according to Sikorski's explanation, was to aim at creating a common policy 
towards Germany after the war, in order to exclude any possibility of renewed 
German aggression. The Norwegians, however, were not at all enthusiastic 
about the idea.2l6 Some days later Or J6zef Retinger, Sikorski's private 
secretary, returned to the matter during a conversation with Trygve Lie. To 
Lie the whole thing still appeared rather nebulous. He pointed out to Dr 
Retinger that the Norwegian government was not likely to participate in any 
project "that might incite Russian suspicions".217 As it turned out, this was 
also the view of the British and the American governments, which soon 
induced general Sikorski to shelve the project. 
In a letter to Rolf Andvord in June 1942, Trygve Lied ascribed to himself 
a major role in the efforts to stop what he described as Sikorski's plan of 
creating "something like a bloc of the governments of the eight occupied 
countries, a bloc which in my opinion could only be directed against the Soviet 
Union".21B Lie was not alone in his interpretation of Sikorski's planned 
declaration. The American ambassador to the governments-in-exile, Anthony 
Drexel Biddle, held opinions similar to Lie's. When the Poles asked him what 
he thought of the planned declaration, he replied 
that I personally believed that before launching any such move at this 
time, it should be put to the "acid test"; would it in any way prove 
offensive to the Russians? - could it be interpreted by the Russians as a 
move to form a bloc against lhem?219 
Such was the view of Trygve Lie as well. He told the British that he opposed 
the Polish plans for two reasons. Firstly, the Norwegians were in ravour of 
close cooperation with Great Britain and the USA, whereas the Polish project 
was inspired by the ideology of small-state cooperation. Secondly, Norwegian 
support of Sikorski's idea might damage Norwegian-Soviet relations,"which were 
at present quite good"_22o The proposed declaration would, according to Lie, 
serve no other purpose than to "incite Russian suspicions". Lie consequently 
planned to tell the Soviets that the Norwegian government had been invited to 
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Jam a declaration by the governments-in-exile, but that they were inclined to 
refrain from doing SO.221 
Some days later Lie accordingly asked Alexandr Bogomolov "if he was 
aware of the Polish plans of a joint declaration by the eight occupied small 
countries in Europe". Bogomolov was indeed aware of them, and he did not 
disagree with Lie's inference that the Soviet government would not wish the 
plan to be realized.222 The Soviet attitude was signalled more bluntly to the 
Polish government. Bogomolov explained to Kajetan Morawski, the Polish 
deputy foreign minister, that "Russia had a loathing for all pacts which aimed 
at shaping the future, and in particular for agreements to which she was not a 
party". There could be no arrangements in Europe, and in particular not in 
Enstern Europe, which excluded the Soviet Union.223 
The Soviets were content with the attitude of the Norwegian government. 
In April 1943, Alexandr Bogomolov told the Norwegian minister of finance, Paul 
Hartmann. that the Soviet government was fully aware of Norway's desire to 
remain on good terms with the Soviet Union. They had noted with satisfaction 
that the Norwegian government, together with the Dutch and the Belgians, had 
kept aloof from the Polish anti-Soviet machinations.224 
Norway, the Soviet Union and future NordiC cooperation 
The discussion about federative solutions on the European continent was, at 
least in the minds of the Norwegian politicians in London, closely linked to 
the question of post-war Nordic cooperation. The Norwegian government's 
violent reaction, when articles in the Swedish and British press in the spring 
of 1942 raised the notion of developing Nordic cooperation as an alternative or 
supplement to the Atlantic policy. may at the first glance seem to be greatly 
exaggerated in view of the limited significance and authority of the Swedish 
proponents of the "Nordic" orientation. Lie and his government were, however, 
of the opinion that a "Nordic bloc" in the minds of its proponents was 
imagined as constituting the northernmost link of the Central-European system. 
Thus the discussion about cooperation in Scandinavia, as well as the ideas of 
continental confederations, gnined in importance by force of their mutual 
interdependence. 
The idea of a "Nordic bloc" linked to a system of federations or confede-
rations on the European continent was seen by the Norwegian government as 
contrary to Norway's interests. The familiar argument was that Norway had 
more in common with the countries bordering on the Atlantic, above all with 
Great Britain and the USA. than with most of the continental European 
countries. More important, however, were considerations of possible repercus-
sions in the realm of relations with the Soviet Union. Arter the war, Arne 
Ording admitted that the government had treated the discussions about Nordic 
cooperation in the spring of 1942 "a little too seriously". Nonetheless, accor-
ding to Ording, the matter had gained in importance by its connection with 
the "Polish propaganda" for small-state federations in Europe. liThe Russians 
were very disturbed by this propaganda, and consequently they did not like the 
idea of a Nordic federation eilher."225 
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Towards the Liberation of Norway 
In the preceding paragraphs we have discussed the evolution of Norwegian-
Soviet relations from the German invasion on 9th April 1940 until the signing 
of the agreement on civil affairs etc. between Norway and the three great 
powers on 16th May 1944. An endeavour has also been made to discuss the 
Soviet Union as a determining factor in Norwegian foreign policy during the 
period. Norwegian-Soviet relations during the period from the outbreak of war 
until the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 was characterized 
primarily by the two countries' different relationship with Germany, which led 
to an almost complete absence of Norwegian-Soviet cooperation. The uncer-
tainty as to the future role of the Soviet Union in the war and in the post-
war world made it impossible for the Norwegian government to ascribe to the 
Soviet Union any clearly defined role in its long-range foreign policy planning. 
After 22nd June 1941 the two governments had to arrive at some sort of 
modus vivendi with a view to the war effort against the common enemy. This 
being accomplished, the next task was to further develop the relations, 
searching for possible fields of cooperation and means of developing a minimum 
of mutual confidence. As it turned out, the presence of the Soviet Union in 
the allied camp also became a limiting factor for the foreign policy options 
open to the Norwegian government. 
As the ultimate victory in the war approached, the attention of the 
Norwegian government in London was increasingly directed towards making 
arrangements for the liberation or reconquest of Norway. Simullaneous)y, 
problems related to the post-war political organization of Europe and the world 
grew in importance and urgency. The Atlantic policy of Trygve Lie was to no 
small degree meant to signal Norway's uncompromising will to reject the old 
ideas of neutrality and participate fully in the war-time alliance. In the last 
years of the war Norwegian foreign policy doctrines had to be adjusted to 
meet the demands of the post-war period as well. As a consequence, the 
Atlantic policy was forced to recede into the background during 1943 and 1944, 
though the process was a gradual and ambiguous one. 
The signing of the agreement on jurisdiction etc. on 16th May 1944 
marked a turning point in the bilateral Norwegian-Soviet relations: for the 
first time is was openly admitted that Soviet forces would possibly participate 
in the liberation of Norway. More than anything else, the situation created by 
this fact was to determine the Norwegian policy towards the Soviet Union 
during the following months. 
MWlary cooperaliorl colllillued 
The agreement of 16th May 1944 about jurisdiction and civil administration in 
Norwegian areas liberated by an allied expeditionary force, was designed for a 
situation whereby allied troops. under Soviet. British. or American command, 
advanced on Norwegian territory fighting retiring German detachments. In 
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areas affected by military operations, it was stipulated that during a first 
phase 
the Commander in Chief of the Expeditionary Force on land must, to the 
full extent necessitated by the military situation, exercise SUpreme 
responsibility and authority. 
The relations between the allied commander and the local Norwegian military 
and civil authorities during the first, or military, phase was to be arranged 
according to the agreement's paragraph 3: 
(a) During the first phase the Commander-in-Chief will make the 
fullest possible use of the advise and assistance which will be rendered to 
him by Norwegian liaison officers attached to his staff for civil affairs 
and included in the personnel of a Norwegian military mission to be 
appointed by the Norwegian Government. He will also make the fullest 
possible use of loyal Norwegian local authorities. 
(b) The Norwegian liaison officers referred to in sub-paragraph (a) 
above will, so far as possible, be employed as intermediaries between the 
Allied military authorities and the Norwegian local authorities. 
The talks preceding the signing of the agreement had not, however, led to the 
elaboration of procedures for the practical implementation of the agreement's 
various stipulations. In the case of Great Britain and the USA, this (ask raised 
no serious difficulties. The implementation of the Norwegian-Soviet agreement 
proved to be ::1 more tedious and lengthy affair. In the following I shall 
restrict the discussion on the subject to questions related to the appointment 
and despatch of a Military Mission to work with the Russians, and to the 
efforts to arrange for Norwegian troops to participate in an eventual Soviet 
entry into Norway. 
During a luncheon following the signing of the agreement on 16th May, Lie 
promised to send ambassador Lebedev a memorandum presenting the views of 
the Norwegian government on the implementation of the agreement's various 
stipulations. 226 The Norwegians were, for the time being, apparently not overly 
eager to make the agreement operational, certainly they were in no hurry to 
send the promised memorandum to ambassador Lebedev. This might be due to 
developments on the Finnish-Soviet frontier where, notwithstanding the break-
down of the Finnish-Soviet negotiations, no major operations were seen until 
the Red Army started its decisive offensive against the Finns on 9th June 
1944. A possible Soviet offensive against the Germans in Norway thus being 
postponed to the indefinite future, Lie and advisors saw no reason to push on 
with the implementation of the agreement, although Lie personally may have 
favored a speedy despatch of a Norwegian Military Mission to the Soviet 
Union.227 
Once more the minister of justice, Terje Wold, proved to be the member 
of cabinet most conscious of the possible value of Norwegian participation in a 
Soviet move into Norway. After the signing of the agreement on civil affairs, 
Wo Id set out to argue in favour of the immediate appointment of the Military 
Mission to be sent to the Murmansk front in the course of the summer. The 
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Norwegian government should, according to Wold, also declare itself ready to 
send parts of the Norwegian forces in Scotland to the Soviet Union. The 
minister of justice stressed the "political significance" of the matter, no doubt 
holding the view that the chances of safeguarding Norwegian territorial 
integrity, and Norwegian interests in general, would be enhanced if Norwegian 
troops were present if and when the Soviets crossed the border.228 
The launching of the Soviet offensive on the Karelian Isthmus on 9th 
June 1944 prompted Lie to raise the question of a military mission and des-
patchment of Norwegian troops to the Soviet Union in a cabinet meeting on 
13th June. 229 The cabinet decided to offer the Soviet government negotiations 
about the detailed implementation of the agreement, in accordance with the 
stipulations of the text. The talks were to be conducted either in London or in 
Moscow.230 Two days later ambassador Lebedev was handed an Aide-Memoire 
whereby the Norwegian government expressed itself prepared "to open discus-
sions with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in order 
to come to a practical arrangement" regarding the sending of the Military 
mission and Norwegian liaison officers to the Soviet Union. 231 Lie returned to 
the matter on several occasions during the summer of 1944, urging the Soviets 
lO reply to the Norwegian proposal. The Norwegians had, however, to wait 
until the Russians actually crossed the Norwegian-Soviet border in October 
1944 before the Soviet government deemed it necessary to give an official 
reply to the Norwegian Aide-Aft'moir£'. 
The skeptical attitude in the Norwegian military establishment towards military 
cooperation with the Soviet Union prevailed even after the signing of the May 
agreement. An exchange of opinions between the Defence High Command and 
the Army Command throws an interesting light on the different views on the 
matter within the highest military circles. The commander-in-chief of the 
Norwegian armed forces, general Wilhelm Hansteen, held the view that the 
administrative arrangements would in principle be identical whether the 
liberation of Norway was launched from the West or from the East. In case of 
a Russian offensive against the Germans in Eastern Finnmark, "some [Norwe-
gian) field contingents" should be sent to the Kirkenes area from Great 
Britain, together with civil administrative organs and a relief expedition to 
take care of the civilian population. The field contingents were initially to 
limit their task to functions of guarding and policing the liberated areas. 
Differences in training, equipment, and supply would complicate attempts at a 
more intimate cooperation with the Soviet forces. General Hansteen continued: 
If both partners agree, it might thus prove unnecessary to engage in the 
difficult task of defining more detailed arrangements as to matters of 
command etc. over Norwegian and Russian forces similar to the stipu-
lations regulating the relations between our field troops and an Allied 
expeditionary force of which they are part. 232 
The Army Command (HOK) objected to the views of general Hansteen. arguing 
that the cooperation with Soviet. British. and American troops in Norway must 
be subject to equal terms. liOK interpreted the May agreement to the effect 
that Norwegian field troops, in an area of Norway under liberation by Soviet 
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troops, would be under the command of the local Soviet commander-in-chief, 
similar to the arrangement in case of an invasion froUl the west. HOK obvi-
ously felt that general Hansteen's letter showed only lukewarm support for 
active participation by Norwegian troops if the Red Army moved into Norway. 
The maintenance of good relations with the Soviet ally, according to HOK, 
demanded "our wholehearted participation in the task of liberation".233 General 
Ho.nsteen felt forced to deny that he intended "to show restraint in an 
eventual cooperation with the Russians in Eastern Finnmark".23'( There are, 
however, reasons to believe that the Army Command was right in its suspi-
cions. There are, for instance, few indications of any operational planning to 
prepare for Norwegian cooperation with the Russians in Eastern Finnmark. 
On 5th September 1944, at 7:00A.M., the fighting along the Finnish-Soviet 
front came to a halt, and on 19th September the two countries signed an 
armistice agreement. The Petsamo (Pechenga) area was ceded to the Soviet 
Union, and the Soviet Union and Norway became neigh boring states, with a 
common border stretching some two hundred kilometers to the west and south 
from the outlet of the river Grense lacobselv located to the East of Kirkenes. 
On 7th October the Red Army launched its offensive westward from the rivet 
Lilsa, forcing the German 20th army to retreat to Norwegian territory. On 
18th October the first Soviet detachments crossed the border from the eastern 
bank of Grense Jacobselv, continuing their offensIve towards Kirkenes, which 
was seized against heavy German resistance on 25th October. The Soviet 
forces, about a division in size, established themselves in the Kirkenes area, 
revealing no inclinations to proceed further westward. 
Similar to the situation in June, when the launching of the Soviet offensive on 
the Karelian Isthmus had prompted the Norwegians to deliver their Aide-
Mifmoire to ambassador Lebedev, the Soviet-Finnish armistice brought about 
new efforts on part of the Norwegian government to come to terms with the 
Russians about the practical implementation of the May agreement. Lie raised 
the question with Lebedev once more on 6th September, referring to the June 
memorandum, adding that the Norwegian government's offer to send troops to 
the Soviet Union was still valid. The decision in the matter was now left to 
the Soviet government.235 The Defence Council had already decided that the 
Military Mission to the Soviet Union should be appointed as soon as pos-
sible. 236 During September, the Norwegians were growing increasingly anxious 
to make arrangements with the Soviets in case of a Soviet entry into Norway. 
The military attache in Stockholm, lieutenant-colonel Ole Berg, proposed to 
start negotiations with British and Soviet authorities about sending detach-
ments of the "police troops~ in Sweden to Finland. The troops were to march 
against Finnmark "together with Russian troops",237 Terje Wold presented a 
similar proposal. 238 Ambassador Rolf Andvord also stressed the significance of 
the presence of even token Norwegian forces alongside with the Russians. 239 
The government, however. felt unable to act as long as the Soviets did not 
reply to Lie's numerous inquiries since June. At the same time the Norwegians 
were held completely in the dark about Soviet intentions in the North. HO 
Even the Defence High Command (FOK) now felt the need to direct its 
attention to questions related to a possible Soviet entry into Norway, Although 
FOK in its own opinion had been conscious of the importance of establishing 
military contacts with the Soviet Union. they had proceeded from the assump-
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tion that Norway was defined as belonging to the operational zone of the 
western powers.2H The Finnish-Soviet armistice made it urgently necessary to 
establish Norwegian-Soviet contacts in order to safeguard Norwegian interests. 
The Military Mission had to be appointed, though FOK omitted any mentioning 
of an eventual despatch of Norwegian troops to the Soviet Union. 2'(2 
The Norwegians made the final attempt to uncover the Soviet attitude to 
cooperation with the Norwegian government in the North on 15th October 
1944. Ambassador Andvord was then instructed to deliver in the Commissariat 
of Foreign Affairs a memorandum on the following lines: 
I. Do the Russians desire Norwegian troops despatched to the Soviet 
Union via Finland, troops which will be finally organized in the Soviet 
Union in order to participate in operations against the Germans, when 
these are pushed towards Northern Norway, cr. the talks in March. 
2. Do the Russians desire, and will they be instrumental in orga-
nizing, the transport of Norwegian police troops from Sweden to Finland, 
in order to participate in the struggle of the Finns to oust the Germans 
from Finland? 
3. Do the Russians desire our initiative towards the British and the 
Americans to bring Norwegian troops by air and sea to Russian-occupied 
parts of Northern Finland or to Northern Russia? 
4. Do the Russians desire the despatch of a Norwegian military 
mission to Russia, or should it be formed in [lacking word; London?] 
5. Are negotiations being conducted between the Russians, British, 
and Americans on one or more of these questions?243 
After some initial hesitation and contradictory hints ambassador Andvord was 
summoned to Molotov on 18th October. According to Andvord, the commissar 
of foreign affairs made the following declaration: 
With great pleasure the Soviet Government accept all four paragraphs of 
the Norwegian note [i.e. §§ 1-4]. Nothing could be better than the 
Norwegian government's proposal of common action against the Germans. 
We will give you all kind of help and political support, and all you desire 
and need. It is possible that we may, in the immediate future, pursue the 
Germans into Norway. In that case it will be of importance, with regard 
to both the world opinion and the Norwegian people, that Norwegians 
participate and hoist the Norwegian flag over free Norwegian soil. 
Molotov was in favour of the immediate despatch of Norwegian troops to the 
Soviet Union. The details of the arrangements were to be clarified through the 
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet High Command.244 
The Norwegian government did not then know that the first Soviet troops 
had crossed the border that very morning. They were only informed about the 
presence of Soviet troops on Norwegian territory on 25th October, i.e. the day 
of the Soviet entry into Kirkenes. The cabinet met the next day, and decided 
to send the Soviet government the following message: 
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On the occasion of the commencement of Norway's liberation. the 
Norwegian Government sends it warmest greetings to the Government and 
people of the Soviet Union.For more than four years the Norwegian 
people has been oppressed and plundered by the German aggressors. l'hey 
have followed with enthusiasm the heroic and victorious battles of the 
Soviet armies, led by Marshal Stalin. During the war the Norwegian 
Government has received many proofs of the Soviet Government's 
friendship and sympathy for Norway.The people of the most northerly 
part of Norway will great the armies of our Soviet Allies as liberators. 
Norwegian armed forces will take part in the struggle and both the 
Norwegian population and the civil authorities appointed by the Norwegian 
Government will do their utmost in the common struggle against the 
German oppressors. The liberation of the northernmost parts of Norway 
will be greeted with joy and enthusiasm by the whole of the Norwegian 
people, and will further reinforce the friendship between our two coun-
tries. 2-46 
The Norwegians at once set out to arrange for the practical implementation of 
their own proposals and Molotov's declaration. Trygve Lie departed for 
Stockholm, in order to get the Swedish government's consent to the transfer 
of police troops to active service in the North. The decision to go to Stock-
holm was no doubt motivated primarily by the latest development in Norwe-
gian-Soviet relations. Two days earlier Lie had objected to the idea of visiting 
Sweden. The Soviets, according to Lie, were not in favour of a possible 
Norwegian-Swedish rapprochement. 246 Lie left London on 23rd October, and 
was weather-bound on a Scottish airfield when the message arrived of the 
Soviet entry into Norway and the seizure of Kirkenes.H7 
The military authorities, for their part, started planning for the despatch-
ment of Norwegian troops from Scotland to Northern Norway. SHAEF and 
SCOTeO, under whose command were placed the Norwegian troops in Great 
Britain, agreed to send one of the two Norwegian "Mountain Companies", 
though without the greater part of their transportation equipment. The 
members of the Norwegian Military Mission in Russia (NMMR) were appointed, 
and the head of the mission, colonel Arne D. Dahl, was ordered to keep his 
men ready to depart on short notice. 248 The Norwegian troops, who were 
given the code-name "Force 138", left Scapa Flow on 1st November 1944, 
followed by NMMR some days later. "Operation Crofter" was set in motion. The 
Norwegians arrived in Murmansk on 6th and 7th November. and continued by 
land and sea to the Kirkenes area on the Norwegian side of the border. The 
Military mission established itself at Bjarnevatn, a mining centre to the South 
of Kirkenes, while the mountain company was ordered to patrol the vast 
territories between the Soviet forces and the Germans further to the West. 
The Norwegian troops were under Soviet operational command. During January 
and February 1945 the soldiers from Scotland were reinforced by some 
companies of police troops from Sweden. 
Trygve Lie and the minister of defence, Oscar Torp, argued in favour of 
making the Norwegian presence in Eastern Finnmark as strong as possible. 
Other members of the cabinet, foremost among them premier Johan Nygaards-
void, were more concerned with a possible combined action further to the 
South in order to cut off the German retreat from Norway's two northernmost 
counties, Finnmark and Troms. 249 The German withdrawal from Finnmark was 
accompanied by a ruthless policy of scorched earth, and Nygaardsvold's motives 
were almost purely humanitarian in their origin. 
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Trygve Lie defended the concentration of the Norwegian military effort in 
Eastern Finnmark by pointing to the danger of the Soviets using a feeble 
Norwegian military presence in the area as a pretext for not withdrawing their 
troops from Norwegian territory.25o Lie attached importance to this point, and 
during a conversation with general I-Iansteen and Oscar Torp in the middle of 
December he even demanded an increase in the number of Norwegian troops to 
be sent to Eastern Finnmark. According la Lie, the Soviet troops expected to 
be replaced by Norwegians, and it would hardly be understood in Moscow if 
the Norwegian government made no efforts to transport more troops from 
Great Britain and Sweden to the area. 251 Lie expressed his opinion in a letter 
to general Hansteen: 
I point to [ ... J the impossibility of resuming complete Norwegian sove-
reignty in Eastern Finnmark, with Norwegian administration and military 
command etc., unless we send to this part of the country at least the 
military forces which it was originally decided to send there: It is my 
personal belief that the Russians, when they feel safe by an adequate 
military presence in the area, will ( ... ] renounce the power or command 
which they now possess in accordance with the agreement on CivjJ 
Affairs from May 16, 1944.252 
Trygve Lie, in other words, envisaged sending Norwegian troops to Eastern 
Finnmark in a number which would make the Soviet presence, in terms of 
military considerations at least, superfluous. Thereafter the Norwegian govern-
ment would demand the restoration of the complete authority of Norwegian 
civil and military organs. 253 
Thus it may be stated that at least the minister of foreign affairs was 
not completely reassured about the Soviets' further intentions with their 
military presence in Eastern Finnmark. There is, on the other hand, scarcely 
any evidence pointing to the existence in Norwegian government circles of a 
fear that the Soviet Army might resume its drive westward in Finnmark with 
the aim of annexing additional Norwegian territory. Lie's conversations with 
Molotov and deputy commissar of foreign affairs Dekanozov, during his stay in 
Moscow in November 1944, were Quite reassuring on this point. Molotov on 
several occasions told Lie that the Soviet troops had done their part of the 
job, now it was left to the Norwegians to finish the lask.2fi.t Lie apparently 
drew two set of conclusions from Molotov's and Dekanozov's remarks. Firstly, 
he felt convinced that the Soviet forces were not going to proceed forcefully 
in Northern NorwaY,255 i.e. they would remain within the area they had 
occupied by the beginning of November 1944. Lie had previously felt frustrated 
at the lack of information about Soviet intentions in Northern Norway. In the 
beginning of December, however, he argued in favour of the view that there 
was no more need 
to raise once more the Question of how far the Soviets intend to 
penetrate into Norwegian territory in the course of liberating Norway, or 
over which areas they eventually want to exercise operational control. 256 
Secondly, Lie held the opinion that it was primarily up to the Norwegians 
themselves whether the Soviets were going to stay where they were, or resume 
the offensive. His opinion on this point may have been reinforced by repeated 
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Soviet calls for a more serious Norwegian military commitment.Z57 The Soviets 
left Norwegian and British civil and military authorities in no doubt as to their 
low opinion of the size of the Norwegian miliary contribution.258 
After their arrival in Murmansk. the Norwegian forces and the Military 
Mission had no reason to complain about lack of Russian hospitality. The 
cooperation between the Norwegian and Soviet forces and their commanders 
also later evolved to the satisfaction of colonel Dah1.259 The Soviets even 
contributed to supplying the poorly equipped Norwegian forces with food and 
equipment. 
The local Norwegian military authorities' evaluation of Soviet intentions 
in the area was more ambiguous. The attitude of their Soviet counterparts 
seemed to indicate a friendly and benevolent relationship.26o Colonel Dahl, 
despite his satisfaction with the state of the Norwegian-Soviet cooperation, 
feared nonetheless that the Soviets had sinister intentions: 
There is a great danger that they [i.e. the Soviets] will never depart, and 
that they regard Sor- Varanger to [he head of the Varanger-fjord - river 
Tana as their sphere of interest and plan to move the border to the line 
mentioned above. Z61 
As lale as April 1945 Dahl sent an alarming report, warning of an imminent 
Soviet offensive towards the county of Troms. 1t seems, however, that the 
government did not attach too much importance to Dahl's warnings, which 
were partly based on rather dubious evidence. 
The Soviets. not surprisingly, were bent on easing the Norwegian anxiety 
about what might happen to Finnmark. The signal was clearly received in 
London when, in March 1945, the head of the Nordic department in the 
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, proposed to appoint a Soviet-Norwegian 
commission to survey "the old border" between the two countries.z62 
At this point it seems fair to conclude that Lie, quite soon after the Soviet 
entry into Norway, reached the opinion that the Soviets did not entertain far-
reaching expansionist intentions in Norway. He did, however, fear that the Red 
Army might establish itself in Eastern Finnmark for an unspecified period. 
Abandoning IlIl! Atlanlic policy? 
A speech by the South African Field Marshall lan Christiaan Smuts in Novem-
ber 1943 had revived a discussion about certain aspects of Norwegian foreign 
policy. The arguments used throw revealing light on the implications of Lie's 
Atlantic policy. Smuts argued in favour of organizing close cooperation 
between Great Britain and the other West European countries. in order to 
counterbalance the power of the Soviet Union and the United Slates by 
shaping a "trinity" of forces.263 An editorial in Nors/.:. Tidclld objected la this 
part of Smuts' speech. Smuts, the paper held, was obviously influenced by the 
ideology of "balance of power and spheres of interest". Norsk Tidclld had to 
admit, however, that Smut's scheme bore some resemblance to the Norwegian 
Atlantic policy. But it was argued that the resemblance was a superficial one, 
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because the Norwegian schemes had always envisaged American participation, 
and the planned defence system in the North Atlantic was, according to Norsk 
Tidelld, to be organized "in intimate cooperation with the Soviet Union~.264 
The article in the official Norwegian newspaper was precipitated by a 
conversation on the matter between Lie and Collier. The Norwegian minister of 
foreign affairs deplored the public presentation of the idea to group the 
smaller West European states around Great Britain. According to Lie, such 
plans were bound to incite Soviet suspicions. 
Lie went on to say that there were now more signs [ ... ] that the Russians 
would be likely to take a suspicious and unhealthy interest in Norwegian 
foreign policy, if it showed signs of linking up with that of this country 
and that of America. [ ... ] 
He did not himself actually fear Russian territorial designs on any 
part of Norway; but he did fear that the Soviet Government might try, 
for reasons of their own, to prevent the Norwegian Government from 
conducting their foreign affairs in the way in which he would like to see 
them conducted, and that was lhe main reason why he regretted the 
publication of Smuts' speech.26s 
Lie's statement gave rise to a discussion in the Foreign Office. One officer 
held the view that the statement was contradictory to Lie's own cherished 
idea: the Atlantic Ocean policy, which would involve Norway in close collabo-
ration with Great Britain and the United States: "If Mr. Lie is arraid of 
Norway taking this course, then why does he proclaim [ ... ] in favour of it?" It 
was held that the rising power of the Soviet Union obviously had forced Lie 
to change his mind. The only commentator who felt that Lie's statement did 
not signiry a change of his views was G.M. Gathorne-Hardy. He maintained 
that from the very introduction of the idea the Soviet Union had been 
ascribed a role in the North Atlantic cooperation. In his opinion the Norwe-
gians were particularly opposed to the idea of creating a third block to 
counterbalance the power of USA and the Soviet Union. 
In the Foreign Office, Lie's rejection of Smuts' ideas was seen as one 
more sign of a growing Norwegian fear lest the Russians had their own designs 
ror Northern Norway. This anxiety might dispose the Norwegian government 
towards downgrading its advocacy of the Atlantic policy, whiCh would in fact 
imply some sort of alliance between Norway and Great Britain and the USA.266 
At approximately the same time, Lie, in a conversation with Collier, left 
the impression that the idea of an Atlantic security system was not at all 
abandoned. After the signing or the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship, 
mutual assistance and postwar cooperation on 12th Deeember 1943, Lie feared 
that the Soviet government might demand a similar agreement with Norway. He 
continued his argument: 
He would not like such a request to come from the Russians before 
agreement had been reached with the British and the Americans on the 
question of Atlantic security, and he thought we might not like it 
either. 261 
The British, however, were bent on avoiding any discussion on Lie's Atlantic 
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projects. The Norwegian minIster of foreign affairs was accordingly to be told 
to shelve the idea of Atlantic defence for the moment.268 
At this point, the Atlantic policy was no longer an expression of the 
official foreign policy doctrine of the Norwegian government. The Norwegians 
continued, however, to argue in favour of regional arrangements within the 
framework of the future world-wide security organization. As late as April 
1944, Nonk Tidend, obviously expressing the government's official view, stuck 
to Norway's wish to participate in a defence system together with the Atlantic 
powers, although "with the consent of the Soviet Union". Norsk Tidend knew 
perfectly well that the idea of regional arrangements was not unequivocally 
endorsed: 
In some quarters there has been fear that a system of regional coope-
ration thus envisaged might give rise to spheres of influence and 
alliances. But this will depend completely on the cooperation between the 
great powers. If this succeeds, the great powers will have no need for 
spheres of influence, and regional security agreements will not have the 
character of alliances, but will serve as a supplement to the obligations 
within the framework of the international organization.269 
Until the end of the war and the conference in San Francisco in the spring of 
1945. official proclamations of Norwegian foreign policy views were increa-
singly adamant in their support of the ideas underlying the new world organi-
zation. The emphasis on regional agreements was correspondingly downgraded. 
Towards the end of the war it was even admitted that regional agreements 
might constitute an element of tension between the great powers. In any case, 
they had to be subordinated to the world organization. Nonetheless, the 
Norwegians continued to assert the small states' interest in the existence of 
regional systems within the framework of the incipient "United Nations 
Organization".27o The main currents of Norwegian foreign policy during the 
period from Dumbarton Oaks to the Conference in San Francisco were marked, 
however. by the Norwegian government's willingness to support every attempt 
to solidify and further develop the cooperation between the great powers.271 
Trygve Lie himself did not altogether abandon his former ideas. In 
October 1944 he told ambassador Lcbedcv that the Norwegian government had 
deliberately chosen to avoid propagating the idea of Atlantic cooperation after 
the Soviet response on Tht' prillcipal features of Norway's foreign policy. But 
the Norwegian attitude "as to the necessity and advantage of a regional 
agreement between the Atlantic countries. now called Western Europe, has 
surely not changed".27Z The Norwegian doctrine was indeed an ambiguous one. 
In November 1944, during Lie's visit to Moscow, the Soviets introduced into 
the Norwegian-Soviet relations the question of altering the Paris-agreement of 
1911 on Spilzbergen, which had placed the archipelago under Norwegian 
jurisdiction and sovereignty since 1925. Along with Questions related to the 
organizatitln of a Norwegian armed presence in Northern Norway. the Spitz-
bcrgen affair loomed large during the last period of Norwegian-Soviet war-time 
collaboration. Molotov introduced the matter on the night or 12th November 
1944, suggesting a revision or the Paris treaty with a view to a possible 
remilitarization of the archipelago. According to the Soviet proposition, the 
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main Spitzbergcn archipelago was in the future to be administered as a Soviet-
Norwegian condominium, while Norway was to cede Bear hland to the Soviet 
Union.273 
During the following months the Norwegian government was app3rently 
inclined to go rather far in order to reach an agreement that satisfied the 
Soviets. Which were the considerations deciding the Norwegian response in the 
Spitzbergen affair? 
The availablE~ evidence, scrutinized by Dlav Riste in volume two of 
"Lolldoll-rt'gjeringa", seems to give no unambiguous answer to the question. The 
Norwegian policy of compliance may be interpreted as an expression of the 
Norwegian government's intentions to make the affair a test-case of its will of 
non-declaratory "bridge-building", by accepting the Soviet demands as legiti-
mate in view of Soviet economic and security interests. In my opinion, the 
single most dominant factor in the deliberations of the government is likely to 
have been the presence of Soviet troops on Norwegian soil. The uncertainty as 
to the Soviet intentions in occupying an area in Eastern Finnm:J.rk made it 
imperative not to give the Russians any pretext to prolong the presence or 
even expand the area occupied by their troops. Norwegian obstinacy in face of 
Soviet demands might trigger off some sort of unpleasant Soviet action in the 
North. There is no lack of evidence, as has been shown above, of Lie's 
preoccupation with the prospects of a postponement of the Red Army's 
departure from Norwegian territory. Continuing this line of argument, it seems 
likely that the government was of the opinion that still worse Soviet demands 
might be avoided by a show of compliance on its part. 
The Spitzbergen affair did not result in a visible change in the policy of 
the Norwegian government towards the great powers. The affair, on the other 
hand, undoubtedly left the Norwegians conscious of the possibility of unex-
pected and unpleasant exigencies arising out of the privilege of bordering on 
the Soviet Union. Tbe affair may have reinforced the Norwegian anxiety as to 
Soviet long-range intentions. In other words: the Spilzbergen experience 
demonstrated the necessity of a policy of "bridge-building" in Norway's 
relations with the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and the western 
powers, while at the same time exposing the limitations of the doctrine. 
We will end the treatment of the Norwegian-Soviet relations during the last 
period of the war by citing some messages from Rolf Andvord, the indefati-
gable ambassador to Moscow. Andvord had distinguished himself by his 
optimistic reports and forecasts of the future Soviet foreign policy, and by his 
similarlY sanguine estimates of the evolution of the relations between the great 
powers after the war. Nonetheless, during the last months of the war Andvord 
became aware that there were rising tensions between the great allies. In 
February 1945 he still held optimistic, although somewhat Qualified, views, 
stating that the Soviet Union would presumably "cooperate loyally with the 
other cultured nations to maintain peace".274 
After the Yalta conference, however, the alliance waS confronted with 
mounting difficulties. "Man nevcr had a more successful conference than that 
in Yalta", William A verell Harriman told Andvord, "but since then nothing has 
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been omitted here in Moscow that could spoil the results of it.,,275 Andvord 
concluded: 
It is still my opinion, that when the second world war is over, the 
development in this country {i.e. the Soviet Union} will take a turn which 
will create better and more healthy conditions for cooperation with the 
western powers [ ... ). Let us fervenlly hope that this will be the case. We 
ought not to forget, that after the defeat of Germany, the bonds linking 
the Soviet Union to the western powers will disappear. Simultaneously the 
treatment of Germany and her satellites will create a number of difficult 
and delicate problems. Certainly, it will not be an easy task to conduct 
the foreign policy of the great powers during the first years after the 
war. 276 
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Conclusion 
The German attack on Norway on 9th April 1940, which brought Norway into 
the waf on the allied side~ came at a moment of low ebb in Norwegian-Soviet 
relations. It seems that never since the revolutionary upheavals in Russia in 
1917 had the Soviet Union enjoyed less sympathy and support in Norwegian 
opinion and among Norwegian politicians. The Soviet-German cooperation in 
Poland, and the Soviet attack on Finland in the autumn of 1939, placed the 
Soviet Union amongst the ranks of aggressor stales on line with Hitler's 
Germany. Reports of purges, famines and show-trials during the preceding year 
had left the Soviet system with little of its original attractiveness. Now, Jaden 
with the burden of critical attitudes, the Norwegian government set out to 
formulate a polky to ...... ards the Soviet Union, at the same time attempting to 
include Russia in its long-term foreign policy planning. 
We have noted signs of a profound anxiety during the campaign In 
Norway in the spring of 1940, among politicians and military leaders alike, of 
possible Soviet intentions to move into and occupy parts of Northern Norway. 
The traditional "ru5sophobia" reasserted itself, now prompted by the Soviet 
policy towards Poland and Finland. The "russophobia", or fear of Soviet 
intentions to forward demands on Norwegian territory, remained as an under-
current in the Norwegian government's policy towards the Soviet Union for the 
rest of the war. On several occasions Norwegian military authorities demon-
strated their skeptical attitude towards cooperation with the Russians. The 
Norwegian policy leading to the signing of the May agreement in 1944, and the 
subsequent despatchment of Norwegian troops to Northern Norway, must be 
understood primarily as precautionary measures to obstruct any sinister Soviet 
intentions. In view of this, there is no need to search far for an explanation 
of the vehement l\'orwegian reaction to Roosevelt's free port scheme and 
Molotov's Spitzbergen proposals. Nevertheless, as the war progressed, the 
Norwegian "russophobia" lost some of its former strength, though it tended to 
reappear when the Norwegians were forced to evaluate certain Soviet inilia-
tives; or what was thought to be Soviet initiatives. 
After 22nd June 1941, when Norway and the Soviet Union became allies 
in the war against Germany, the idea of "bridge-building" appeared as an 
element in Norway's policy towards the Soviet Union and the western great 
powers. In contrast to the ~russophobia", the new doctrine could only to a 
small degree be traced back to a tradition in Norwegian foreign policy. In the 
inter-bellum period, Norwegian foreign policy had shown signs of isolationism 
and seclusion rather than of intentions to build bridges. Much of Norway's 
foreign policy activity had been invested in developmemt of the relations with 
other small and medium-size countries, primarily the other Scandinavian ones. 
The new doctrine of "bridge-building" developed during the war was, at least if 
taken literally, far more ambitious. It defined its main goal as contributing to 
the continuation of the war-time collaboration between the Soviet Union and 
the western great powers in the post-war period. The doctrine evolved from 
the realization of how much Norway's security depended on the existence of a 
degree of harmony and low tension between East and West. 
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Thus the Norwegian policy towards the Soviet Union was pulled between 
the seemingly opposite tendencies of "russophobia" and "bridge-building". But a 
fear of possible Soviet expansionist intentions might in itself point in the 
direction of working for a state of low tension between the great powers. The 
Soviets were likely to set out to realize their eventual ambitions only in times 
of immediate crisis. And, the other way round, a policy which in fact origi-
nated in intentions to forestall presumed Soviet plans might present itself to 
the world as a piece of practical "bridge-buildingn, The policy resulting in the 
signing of the May agreement in 1944 is a case in point. 
What, then, was the content of the policy of "bridge-building" during the 
war, on the non-declaratory level? The government itself was intent on 
transferring the doctrine from the level of declarations to that of operational 
policy. The Norwegian altitude to the Soviets' eagerness for a Norwegian-
Soviet agreement on shipping, however, indicates that the obstacles to "bridge-
buildingn might be numerous and hard to overcome. The "bridge-building" 
doctrine, aiming primarily at influencing the decisions of the great powers, left 
means of only limited scope at the disposal (lf the Norwegian government on 
the non-declaratory level. Representing a small country, the policy makers in 
most cases had to limit themselves to expressions of preparedness to help 
events take a positive course, From this point of view, the enthusiastic and 
whole-hearted support for the new world organization may be seen as the 
single most important result of the Norwegian ideology of "bridge-building". 
The doctrine of "bridge-building" may as well be viewed as a return to a 
more passive conduct of Norwegian foreign policy, whereas the Norwegian 
government had displayed initiative in the alliance by introducing the idea of 
Atlantic cooperation. Inlroducing the Atlantic policy, Trygve Lie had pledged 
Norway to play an active part and take its share in building the post-war 
political order in Europe. A policy of "bridge-building", by its vague statement 
of aims and means, left greater leeway for manoeuvre. The Atlantic policy may 
further be regarded as a formalization of the implicit precondition for Nor-
way's pre-war security policy, namely Norway's dependence on support from 
the west in times of crisis. In this less benevolent interpretation, the "bridge-
building" doctrine may be seen as a return to [he policy of neutrality, under 
the umbrella of Great Britain and the United States' presumed self-interest in 
protecting Norway from aggression by any other great power. 
The foreign policy of the Nory.'egian government during the war cannot 
be understood without giving due atlention to the principal imparlance of 
considerations of war-time a!liance policy. The Atlantic policy had, however, 
much wider implications. In the post-war period the tasks to be solved by 
Atlantic cooperation were qualitatively different from tbe aims to be pursued 
by the doctrine of "bridge-building". The two doctrines did not mutually 
exclude each other. "Bridge-building" could lay the foundations of peace, 
Atlantic cooperation should be constructed to safeguard it. Considerations of 
expediency could, however, make it seem less opportune to propagate the 
military aspects of Atlantic cooperation while at the same time conducting a 
policy of "bridge-building". Lie and his government consequently had to draw 
less public attention la the Atlantic projects, but they did not abandon the 
considerations of strategy which formed the foundation.s of the doclrine, 
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The Atlantic policy was not, during the war, primarily envisaged as a 
counter to a possible futUre Soviet threaL. There could, on the other hand, be 
no Question of Lie and his advisors leaving this eventuality out of conside-
ration, and the Soviet Union was never intended to participate in the system. 
This is true even for the period after the entry of the Soviet Union into the 
war. The Soviet reaction to The principal features of Norway's foreign policy 
in the autumn of 1942, by pointing to possible Soviet interests to assume their 
part of the responsibility to defend the Atlantic, revealed the necessity of 
toning down the Atlantic propaganda. 
Continuing the discussion initiated on the first page of the introduction, 
an examination of the Norwegian policy towards the Soviet Union seems to 
indicate that Ristc's description of Norwegian foreign policy during the war is 
closer to reality than Udgaard's model. The considerations of strategy and 
security policy at the base of the Atlantic policy were not abandoned. No 
option was in reality open to the Norwegian government other than to conduct 
on the official level a policy of "bridge-building", and this necessity forced 
them to downgrade the public propagation of the Atlantic policy. With an eye 
to the situation after the war, an exclusively western defence system in the 
Atlantic could hardly be perceived as not intended to safeguard against a 
Soviet threat. 
From the Norwegian point of view, a formal implementation of the plans 
for Atlantic cooperation was not indispensable. On the one hand the functional 
bonds, especially in military matters, could be further developed independent of 
any declarations or political agreements. On the other hand the Norwegians 
were convinced that the western powers viewed Norway as belonging to their 
sphere of interest. Thus they were for their own sake expected to take an 
interest in the defence of Norwegian independence. If this assumption proved 
to be in accordance with reality, and the international situations remained in a 
state of relative harmony and absence of acute tensions, Norway would find 
herself in an almost ideal situation. 
The Atlantic policy, made operational, would have implied the formation 
of a kind of military alliance system between Norway, Great Britain, the USA, 
and possibly other "Atlantic" countries, i.e. a western sphere of interest in the 
north-western part of Europe. Lie's objection against including Central 
European countries in the system makes it probable that he was thinking in 
terms of a corresponding Soviet sphere of interest in that part of Europe. 277 
Lie criticized Sikorski for entertaining thoughts of projects which might prove 
offensive to the Soviets. The British, as shown above, were a\l,':lre that the 
Soviet Union might raise objections to the Norwegian Atlantic ideas as well. It 
is reasonable to assume that the apparent lack of logic in Lies reasoning is 
explained by his different approach to matters of political organizations in 
Eastern and Western Europe. According la Lie, Norway was clearly within the 
western sphere of interest, while the Central European countries (Poland 
among others) were not. If this interpretation of Lie's thinking is correct, his 
resistance to the establishment of too close political contacts with the Polish 
government needs no further explanation. Lie's alternative to Sikorski's 
European schemes was thus the partition of Europe into spheres of influence. 
His suppOrt early in the wur of Soviet claims in the Baltic area may be 
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interpreted to support this view.:ns The Poles, as may be expected, were 
extremely critical of the Norwegian Atlantic policy. 
Until the last year of the war, the scope and significance of contacts between 
the Norwegian government and the government in Moscow were limited indeed 
and one may be tempted to conclude that the relations with the Soviet Unjo~ 
were assigned a secondary place in Norwegian foreign policy. The relations and 
collaboration with the two great western allies occupying most of the Norwe-
gian politicians' interest and energy, this view contains a certain a certain 
degree of reality. The Norwegian government and its administrative organs 
were bound 10 Great Britain by a tight-knit web of military and civil coope-
ration. The Norwegians were almost daily presented with tasks to be solved in 
consultation with the British and US governments. 
During the first years of the war, the relations with the Soviet Union 
were marked by an absence of matters of common interest that might prove 
incentives for the launching of ventures in military and civil cooperation. They 
waged dirrerent wars, though against the Common enemy. A superficial glance 
at the relations between the two countries may leave the impression of a 
Norwegian "non-policy" towards the Soviet Union. And in fact the Norwegian 
policy towards the Soviet Union revealed itself primarily outside the realm of 
purely Norwegian-Soviet relations. 
Relations with the Soviet Union had to take into consideration a set of 
uncertainties as to Soviet conduct in foreign affairs. Until June J941 the 
future turn of the So,'iet-German relations was the object of speculations. 
Later, when the Soviets were safely established among the allied United 
Nations. the uncertainty as to further Soviet intentions remained. Only during 
the final stage of the war did Soviet war aims begin to reveal themselves in 
some detail to the other allies. The governments of the smaller allied countries 
had moreover only limited access to existing information of Soviet policy. 
These circumstances were bound to put their mark on the ventures into 
Norwegian-Soviet cooperation which were launched during the war. Norwegian 
military authorities were inclined to take a skepticai attitude towards esta-
blishing contacts with the Soviets, though this attitude manifested itself most 
clearly in the beginning of the war. During the first years of the Norwegian-
Soviet de facIO alliance. the Soviets demonstrated more interest in military 
cooperation than did the Norwegians. 
The last year of war and alliance showed a somewhat different picture. In 
the spring of 1944 the Norwegian government conveyed (0 the Soviets its 
interest in a Norwegian 'armed presence in the North. simultaneously signing 
the Norwegian-Soviet agreement on jurisdiction etc. in liberated areas. By this 
time the roles were changed, and the Soviets refused to give an answer to 
Lie's inquiries. The Soviet endorsement of the Norwegian plans came only after 
the Soviet entry into Norway in October 1944. The effect of the delay on the 
preparations for, and effectiveness of, the Norwegian military effort in 
Finnmark was clearly demonstrated when the Norwegian troops finally arrived 
in November 1944. The pattern is a familiar one, indeed: the Soviets were 
eagerly propagating coopcration between the allies, but tended 10 pluct! 
difficulties in the way of a realizalion of the plans. 
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11 
Strong elements of. traditional Scandinavian "russophobia" continued to influ-
ence the evolution of Norwegian-Soviet relationsouring the second world war, 
even when the Norwegian government gradually redirected .its officlalforeign 
policy doctrine from stmng commitments to North Atlantic military cooperation 
towards a: doctrine of "bridge-building" .. between the great powers. The cltange 
from"Atlantic policy" to "bridge-building" might be expected to have influ-
enced Norway's relations with the Soviet Union. One of the aims of this study 
is to give a general presentation of Norwegian-Soviet relations during the war. 
On this background the study further examines how the redirectioning of 
Norway's foreign policy line made itself felt in the various fields of Norwe-
gian-Soviet relations. The study tends to emphasize the continued presence of 
a skeptical attitude towards the Soviet Union in Norwegian government circles. 
This factor made itself felt when the two countries set out to lay the founda-
tions of war-time cooperation, and also influenced Norwegian long-term foreign 
policy and security planning. 
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